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#### The United States is a medical plantation. Anti-black experimentation and pathologization has institutionalized the idea that black women are disposable and unable to feel pain—this logic paves the way for state-sanctioned murder of black women both inside and outside of the healthcare industry. Black women are dismissed as psychosomatic when they object to harmful treatment. Any objection to this violence is diagnosed as Drapetomanic, an expression of oppositional defiance disorder.

Willoughby-Herard 18 (Tiffany Willoughby-Herard, Associate Professor, African American Studies, University of California, Irvine, and Visiting Faculty Researcher, Institute for Gender Studies, University of South Africa, “(Political) Anesthesia or (Political) Memory: The Combahee River Collective and the Death of Black Women in Custody” Theory & Event Volume 21, Number 1, January 2018 ProjectMuse)

We have now come to the point where the violence by police against Black Women is so lethal that it is common for Black Women to call the police during police stops14—stops that numerous reports indicate are almost always the result of gross negligence, a will to violate and humiliate, and illegal violations of habeas corpus. This violence bespeaks the fundamental relationship between Black Women and the state and the society: whether the perpetrator is known or unknown, an agent of the state, an intimate partner, or the state itself.15 The point of attending to these cases is not to make a spectacle of them but to remember what has compelled armed resistance by Black Women against the pathologists and forensic scientists and policing agents who continually designate state [End Page 262] murder of Black people with the vocabulary of "within policy," "no human involved," and "good kill." Under such regimes of brute force, everything is "within policy." The silence about these murders in custody, in addition to the murders themselves points to the basic incorporation of the practices of the medical plantation on the enslaved into everyday life—and the significance of slave status passing through the line of the mother. These murders bespeak a process of normalizing this violence and suturing it to the good work of life-extending and social order-protecting state. Taking Kenyon Farrow's pleading and caution that progressive Black people attend to: 1) state violence and also intramural violence and, 2) the ways that carcerality operates across institutions with special attention to the medical health industries, I find increasingly that taking the lessons from critical approaches to the study of race and medicine in society opens up how we approach murders of Black Women in custody.16 The study of gender inequality in political science needs a history of "biomedical racialization,"17 the medical plantation, and the surveillance and policing of Black female bodies to theorize an entire discursive world sustained by grief and subjection. These cases are exemplary of the pervasive idea that Black Women are disposable and that whatever injury is done to them serves some necessary and legitimized part of the gender-racial-sexual logic of social order. Such totalizing conditions have drawn activists into the street, onto highways, into fearless physical confrontations, and with the state. This is the world that conjures contemporary collective action against gender inequality, a world that each of us needs to theorize, mobilize against… and ultimately destroy. Though, some of us can afford to jest about "polishing our hoe," or other such tools of self-defense, others of us keep it sharpened and always at the ready. The Slave Polity and the Combahee River Collective There is a political history to be excavated that will help us theorize the relative silence about and acceptance of murders of Black Women in custody today. I have turned to the history of the Combahee River Collective (1970s-1980s), a Boston activist black feminist lesbian movement organization, and the extraordinary and yet fairly normalized violence against Black Women that was part of what the collective was founded to address. … a serial killer killing scores of Black Women and a media blackout—coordinated censorship—about these deaths not being politically relevant or newsworthy. Barbara Smith and the other members of the Combahee River Collective conducted a sustained political theoretical analysis of these women's lives and the social meaning of their deaths (and the only formal investigation worthy of that name) published in two 1979 pamphlets entitled, "Six Black Women: Why Did They Die?" and its updated companion pamphlet [End Page 263] entitled, "Eleven Black Women: Why Did They Die?"18 In 1979, there was a serial killer on the loose in Boston, somebody who probably had a job every day and worked in the civil service, or in some industry, or the private sector, or higher education. Some civilian behaving as a guardian of an anti-Black woman civil society, tortured and killed Black Women because he could. Or perhaps there were multiple serial killers on the loose—or a group. Because the state and society that benefited from these murders and the myths that they propped up did not undertake to view them as an aberration worthy of attention or exploration, the main reason that we know about their existence is because the members of the Combahee River Collective dedicated themselves to bringing attention to these women's lives. I am arguing that Black Women were murdered sans proper investigation in their time and in our own because the long history of the medical plantation, medical discrimination, scientific experimentation, and medical Jim Crow pre-disposed the U.S. population to view Black Women as everything but objects of human sympathy.19 While best well known for their Black Feminist Statement (1977) that challenged the erasure of racialized gender consciousness from movements that could not have existed without their intersectional approach, the Combahee River Collective theorized about these murders by rooting them in Black Women's positionality in the political order of modernity's slave polity. By slave polity I mean the uniquely modern slave polity that passed slave status on from generation to generation through the line of the mother and that reinforced slave status through normalized breeding of Black Women for sexualized punishment to extend the life of the whitened political order. This slave polity also relied on painful human experimentation on Black Women and their reproductive organs thereby doubly sexualizing the non-consensual extraction of new knowledge and new science on their bodies. Consideration of the history of violence against Black Women under slavery goes a very long way in helping us understand how we have arrived at the present moment. After three years of meeting as a collective to clarify their political analysis of the paradigmatic "fissures of race, class, and gender in deindustrializing America" and drawing from a "web of local movements" the Combahee River Collective members wrote passionately about these multiple and interlocking political projects—from polite to coarse—that sought to make them into prey.20 And they reminded the world that they were armed to the teeth just as that Black woman general, Harriet Tubman, a century before them had been. That group of late 20th century women named themselves "The Combahee River Collective" after a late 19th century military battle against the essential paradox of the Americas—the New World's contribution to civilization—the slave polity and freedom negotiated through normalized [End Page 264] and sexualized violence enacted on Black Women's bodies. Such violence produced notions of freedom but also produced and legitimated scientific regimes and forms of medicalization that were associated with extending life for some regardless of the cost for Black Women themselves. The Motive Force of Institutional Life and Civil Society In the following I turn to a few nested examples of the conditions that animated the Combahee River Collective's attention to state, vigilante, and interpersonal violence against Black Women. My examples come from a narrowly tailored examination of the history of scientifically applied management21 of sexual violence on the medical plantation during slavery, (The Anarcha Project, 2006/7) and after (Austin Clarke's The Polished Hoe, 2002, and the Black Lives Matter Movement). While The Anarcha Project22 is the definitive historical-artistic case for describing the ideology of the medical plantation and the uses of Black Women's bodies in slavery, scholars of the legacies of slavery as an institution, practice, set of legal codes, and a cultural logic emphatically contend that the "afterlife of slavery"23 and "post slavery subjects"24 continue to provide robust meaning making about the status of Black Women and the continued use of scientifically applied routinized sexualized violence. Such works point to the sublime ghosts haunting the question of the murders of Black Women in custody, today. These examples are relevant because such systematic violence reflects the fundamental relationship between Black Women and the state and the society: whether the perpetrator is known or unknown, an agent of the state, an intimate partner, or the state itself. These histories of continued and systematic abuse against Black Women served as a unifying force and focus of the many different movements that the women in Combahee brought to their writing and advocacy. This history of violence explains their political commitment to a "shared belief that Black Women are inherently valuable, that our liberation is a necessity not as an adjunct to somebody else's" and the revolutionary possibility in such claims.25 Not defenseless. Not easy prey. Not willing to surrender. Their attention to the "healthy love for ourselves, our sisters and our community" that they considered to be the foundational response to the structural forces that stalked them was revolutionary.26 The Combahee River Collective demonstrated that this violence had to be named, remembered, and forcefully rebuked especially in the face of myriad structural causes that enabled and even urged an individual or group of individuals to kill Black Women and allow them to get away with it. These structural causes include myths about Black Women as unrapeable, super-human, unable to feel pain, and how the "possibilities of their wombs…the speculative value of a reproducing [End Page 265] labor force" the wealth for Empire that could be carved out of their wombs, and their capacities for social reproduction are the motive force of institutional life and civil society.27 All reflect the notion that Black Women have been deemed appropriate objects for socialized, communal, and ritualized acts of state-edifying violence. The Combahee River Collective denounced the silence about the Boston serial killer because the silence about these murders in addition to the murders themselves pointed to basic incorporation of the practices and epistemologies of the medical plantation into everyday life. Mythologies about the imaginary capacities of the "Black body in pain" and "the Black body super-human" are central to the cultural ideologies and norms that undergird racialized medical discrimination and the sexualized violence that extends into civil society and social life through the extermination of Black Women and their reduction to mere use value. In fact, we might even argue that the social reproduction of a whitened civil society, one that continually and progressively secures substantive rights and actual liberties for white and non-Black people, relies heavily on formal and informal practices of sexualized violence against Black Women. Scholars have increasingly turned to the language of the "medical plantation" and its descendant "medical Jim Crow" to explain the proliferation of segregation and coerced medical experimentation in state-funded medical facilities for Black patients. The medical plantation was a type of plantation whose enslaved inhabitants were made available to medical researchers as models for the study of human (that is white and non-Black) biology. Health activists like W. Montague Cobb (1904–1990), head of the NAACP National Health Committee and Editor of the Journal of the National Medical Association organized a major plank of the long civil rights movement focused exclusively on that dimension of the afterlife of slavery that is more commonly known as medical discrimination. It was these health activists who organized with North Carolina medical personnel to successfully challenge segregation in state-funded medical facilities in the 1963 landmark case, Simkins vs. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. Like activists in the Black Women's Health Project28 based in Georgia and Florida just a few years later in 1984, central questions of reproduction have to do with whether, when, or if such persons would or could shoulder the weight of themselves, their families, their histories, and their memories in a world in which structural forms of violence (those forms of violence which allegedly have no origins) directed in peculiar and lasting ways at them would never even be named, mentioned, or alluded to except to shame them. These are questions of social reproduction that are basic to Black Women's lives—not the mere making of babies but, the making of black female lives that can be lived or as the collective members explained "which allows us to continue our struggle and work. [End Page 266] 29 Such myths about the black body not being able to experience pain are reproduced as a matter of course, and as an expression of the afterlife of slavery in the Americas. The existence of social structures and slave polities that attempted to inaugurate the New World through emancipation doctrines that enshrined the particular role of Black Women as antithetical and antagonistic to the production of naturalizable or usable citizens has threaded such myths into Western and Eurocentric practices and institutions. In addition to prospecting in the territory of black reproductivity, discrimination against Black people was masked and justified through allegations about Black sexual and gender perversions and a culture that was deemed pathologically non-heteronormative and non-homonormative.30 In fact the project of gender has been an all out war on Black bodies meaning that attempts to even talk about how sexualized and normalized violence marks us into social categories leaves us with categories whose textures and meanings are typically ill-fitting, useless, and that prohibit clear discussion about what happened, who did it, and what that means in relation to other black bodies. Thus, "[m]erely naming the pejorative stereotypes attributed to Black Women (e.g. mammy, matriarch, Sapphire, whore, bulldagger), let alone cataloguing the cruel, often murderous, treatment we receive, indicates how little value has been placed upon our lives during four centuries of bondage in the Western hemisphere."31 Despite their exhaustive advocacy and research we don't know very much of the details of these Boston 1979 cases exactly because these known structures and myths conspire together and with us to make remembrance of the violence against Black Women deadly and allegedly impossible. Combahee River Collective members pointed to these conditions declaring in their multi-issue and profoundly complex articulation of the term "identity politics": that the most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression…because it is obvious from looking at all the political movements that have preceded us that anyone is more worthy of liberation than ourselves.32 In a subtle though pregnant critique of having served as the literal, symbolic, and psychic engine for countless reiterations of abolitionist democracy with these words they leveled a hard-hitting critique at those structures of violence that lurk within the political projects of alleged allies. This did not mean that they stopped working against all the different forms of structural violence that worked together to enact the world. But, it did mean that they unapologetically evaluated their own position. [End Page 267] For some, the ontological value of Black Women's bodies—drained of life—is not to be found in their breathing and moving and rejection and survival of such conditions, but rather lies in their reduction to broken flesh, to scientific accounts of how the body responds under this particular stress or that particular strain. For example, this particular killer of Black Women in Boston in the early 1970s, like other killers of Black Women in the same decade, was stalking them without fear of sanction, simply replicating a general social order in which the death of Black Women was not even noteworthy by the larger society. But, for others, also invested in the ontological value of Black Women's bodies, but from a different perspective, the existence of this group of Black and Puerto Rican women who remembered and made explicitly political each and every name of a Black Woman slaughtered—in spite of the terror that this remembering inspired—explains the ontological value of Black Women's bodies. Their practice of remembering and insisting on teaching self-defense in order that Black Women would live suggests that Black Women's bodies had some other meanings altogether, a consciousness unto and about themselves; a consciousness that shores up the "psychic stability of the world."33 The Combahee River Collective and their efforts to seek justice for those murdered women in Boston attested to the ongoing commitment to "the movement against the slave trade, the abolitionist movement, the feminist movement, the labor movement…the need for a unified effort and the value of a vision of a society substantially better than the existing one."34 Their will to name the horror of this violence and to marshal a centuries-long toolkit of organized collective action and militant response by Black Women in the Americas to fight against enduring violence is another ontological fact, an oppositional and revolutionary fact about the meaning of Black Women's bodies that insists on being reckoned with. These women used the "Black liberation struggle rather than the American Dream as their yardstick, their gauge, their vantage point" and used "working papers as part of their discipline, part of their effort to be clear, analytical, personal, basic: part of their efforts to piece together an…overview of ourselves too long lost among the bills of sale and letters of transit."35 The Combahee River Collective's "A Black Feminist Statement" was a manifesto that provided evidence of a political philosophy and a political vision that foregrounded violence against Black Women and other Women of Color without collusion with the state, policing, or crime panics—or black heteropatriarchy, either. Their political vision also could enunciate "what Blacks have done to and for themselves"36 through movements, campaigns, advocacy, political education, and a long history of militant self-defense. The Collective wrote a manifesto that articulated a politics and a worldview of racialized gender consciousness that had always operated [End Page 268] from within the heart of liberation movements "as central voices in feminist politics in both the women's movement and Black liberation organizations."37 To consider ourselves now in the light of Combahee means to read the militant Black feminist internationalist activists and philosophies of Combahee as the proper context of Black radicalism. That means that a collective such as this was confirming and declaring a multi-generational practice of a Black sexual and gender politics that aimed to render imperialist, classist, masculinist, nationalist, heteropatriachal, and deeply anti-Black racialized gender norms obsolete—or at least to reveal how these norms existed in antagonism with Black Women's revolutionary self-love. Standing in their defiant reminder to the world that: Above all else, our politics initially sprang from the shared belief that Black women are inherently valuable, that our liberation is a necessity not as an adjunct to somebody else's may because of our need as human persons for autonomy. This may seem so obvious as to sound simplistic, but it is apparent that no other ostensibly progressive movement has ever considered our specific oppression as a priority or worked seriously for the ending of that oppression. Merely naming the pejorative stereotypes attributed to Black women (e.g. mammy, matriarch, Sapphire, whore, bulldagger), let alone cataloguing the cruel, often murderous, treatment we receive, indicates how little value has been placed upon our lives during four centuries of bondage in the Western hemisphere. We realize that the only people who care enough about us to work consistently for our liberation are us. Our politics evolve from a healthy love for ourselves, our sisters and our community which allows us to continue our struggle and work. This focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression. In the case of Black women this is a particularly repugnant, dangerous, threatening, and therefore revolutionary concept because it is obvious from looking at all the political movements that have preceded us that anyone is more worthy of liberation than ourselves. We reject pedestals, queenhood, and walking ten paces behind. To be recognized as human, levelly human, is enough.38 The Combahee River Collective's statement allows us to read our own history through the consciousness that they invoked. But it also compels us to consider not only who we are we after Combahee, but what we can learn by studying the conditions that animated them. What could have happened to Black Women on the East Coast in the 1970s to make them remember a militant response to normalized, un-remarked [End Page 269] upon, and yet fabulously ubiquitous and paradigmatic sexualized violence against Black Women? While it might seem systematic and reasonable to document the cases of murder of Black Women happening now as an ethical way to come to understand who murdered Black women in Boston in 1979, and then in Los Angeles from 1983 on, I need to turn our attention and our clocks back to what seems to be the origin of this current decimation—the slavery era's breeding of Black Women for sexualized punishment to extend the life of individual non-black and white people and to extend the life of the whitened social order. Because that is what the medical plantation was about figuring out how to breed enslaved Black women and learning from enslaved Black women how to protect and care for the lives of every other kind of person. I come to this conversation through questions posed by the collective and their insistence that reproductive justice and reproductive health reflect not merely women's ability to choose whether, when, or if they would bear or rear children but instead the "underlying realities of reproductive lives" which constitute the basis for social reproduction, i.e. the cross-generational status of those who represent wombs carved up for Empire or the status of those hands doing, measuring, and witnessing the carving.39 Such questions of social reproduction and the social world remind me of alleged psychoses like Drapetomania and oppositional defiance disorder (and the pro-slavery social and psychological values) that insist that people in pain experience pain in profoundly individual ways instead of in wholly social ways. I am reminded also of the experience of listening to my 6-year-old son be pathologized as having "super-human strength"40 when adult men fantasize about and project onto him and his brother about how strong they are when playing afterschool program dodgeball—somehow forgetting that they are revealing their own feelings of deficient masculinity in these tellings. Am I to be proud of their alleged super-human strength or frightened at what it portends for their small, small bodies, growing every day in a womb called a social world? The lauded medical research of the father of gynecology, J. Marion Sims (1813–1883) made the transnational jump; crossing the White Atlantic from South Carolina to France and back again.41 Memorialized in public statuary in multiple countries, the question of what we might call his "relationship" to the bodies of the Black Women he experimented upon, Lucy, Anarcha, and Betsey, is unresolved and unsettled. For those of us for whom "medical apartheid" and "medical plantation" are meaningful historiographical concepts, reading the legacies in contemporary culture of this normalized relationship between the murderous gendering of Black Women, on one hand, and the generative gendering of everyone else, on the other hand, is an important [End Page 270] way to understand who and what J. Marion Sims represents. In other words, what was normal in the mid 19th century was that new medical knowledge was sutured to painful, grotesque, deforming, and even deadly medical experimentation on enslaved women across the Americas that enabled the introduction of new medical technologies that advanced the quality of (white) life. Similarly what is normal in our own time is that new medical knowledge and improved quality of life continues to be sutured to medical experimentation on racialized women who have lost their basic civil rights through mass incarceration and territorial segregation even when they consent.

#### The trope of Drapetomania has pervasive force in the United States – any attempt to challenge systemic abuses of anti-black civil society are dismissed as crazed, selfish expressions of personal misfortune

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In the 1800’s psychology and psychiatry were still new and inexact sciences filled with half-cocked, inane ideas about how the brain works. Many new world doctors based their psychiatric theories on the pseudoscience of race. One of the men on the forefront of the burgeoning movement was Dr. Samuel A Cartwright. In 1851 he proposed that there existed a mental illness rampant among slaves that made them belligerent and even caused them to wanted to escape from freedom. He called it Drapetomania. Drapetomania – (n.) a mental illness that causes Negroes to resist the institution of slavery and sometimes flee captivity Even though the scientific evidence for Drapetomania was eventually debunked, the idea of Black resistance as a mental illness still lingers. The Black Panthers of the 1960’s were called “paranoid maniacs.” Fox News and other conservatives routinely paint the Black Lives Matter movement as insane belligerents infected with a hive mentality. After the uprisings in Ferguson and Baltimore, even President Obama had to sit White people down and explain to them that the hordes of young Black people upset by the treatment of the police were not “making this stuff up.” Yet there are many who still believe in the tenets of Drapetomania. The hardcore adherents simply believe that people of color don’t take advantage of the opportunities America has to offer. They believe Black people don’t work hard enough, or are genetically predisposed to an anti-democratic unruliness that causes them to “play the race card” and whine about unfairness instead of focusing on family and education. Even the left-of-center liberals believe that race is not as much a problem as much as socioeconomic disparities and “lack of resources.” They pretend to be accepting and understanding until they guffaw and are taken aback when some “militant” Black grabs the microphone from Bernie Sanders or interrupts a Bill Clinton stump speech. When Ashley Williams unfurled a banner with Hillary Clinton’s own words, during a fundraising event, the crowd actually hissed at her. Hissed. What they fuck, white people? So this is strictly for my NegusWhoRead’s white readers. I know many of you can’t understand how your proclamation of “All Lives Matter,” could upset anyone, or why your Black friends didn’t roll up in a ball and weep at the injustice of the legal system when a jury found O.J. not guilty. It’s because Black people are crazy. They suffer from the now-defunct diagnoses of Drapetomania. It has returned. As in all things–from Avatar to 12 Years a Slave, it is up to our white saviors to notice the symptoms and rescue Black people from impending doom. Here are the classic symptoms so that you will know when your Black friend is suffering from early onset Drapetomania. Stage 1: The Wake Up – Thursday was “whipping day.” There is a slave narrative that tells the story of a little girl who received her first whipping from the slave supervisor. For the entire next week she was on her best behavior, but she was still put in line to receive a flogging. She tried harder the next week, not even uttering a word, but she still received her weekly lashing. Finally she asked her older brother when the whippings would stop. He informed her that it was the slavemaster’s job to whip them so that they would be motivated to work. He told her the beatings would end “when they run out of whippings… Or cotton.” After that, she became the most troublesome Negro on the plantation until she escaped two years later, but she said that day–when she realized she was going to the weekly whipping post for the rest of her life–was the day she stopped being a slave. One day you will arrive at work and notice that Lakeisha in accounts payable cut off all her beautiful, silky jet black hair. No, she didn’t get a case of head lice, nor is she undergoing chemotherapy. This is how Drapetomania begins, but you shouldn’t approach her yet. And FOR GOD’S SAKE DO NOT ASK TO TOUCH HER HAIR! Likewise, if your Black friend, Jamaal wears a daishiki to the company barbecue, take notice but don’t be alarmed. They might be Drapetomania victims, but they are still in the “waking up” phase. It could be temporary. Remember when Randy wore that Scottish Kilt to his grandfather’s funeral? It’s kinda like that. I know it makes you uncomfortable to see anyone eschew the European beauty aesthetic, but suppress your caucasian heebie jeebies and wait. It is your job to watch them closely and see if they wake all the way up. Your job is to make sure that they don’t stay woke. By then it will be too late. They will be off the plantation by then. Stage 2. Speaking Up – Why must Black people frame everything around race? It’s like they are consumed with it? Every time you get into a conversation about politics, current events or even personal stories, they always drag the discussion to race and Blackness. It must be a mental illness because it seems they are so focused on race that they can’t concentrate on anything else. People who suffer from progressive Drapetomania equate race with every social, economic and political phenomenon, whereas most white people don’t focus on race, unless it is concerning Obama. Or an Old Navy Ad. Or a Donald Trump rally. If you’re white the rest of the world views you as a person, or a professional, or a friend, etc. but the world views your Black friend as your BLACK co-worker, or the BLACK professional, or the BLACK whatever. Don’t listen to them, that’s just the Drapetomania talking, even though you do think of Jamaal as your “black friend.” Stage 3. Demand – Stage 3 Drapetomania reveals itself when Black people start wanting stuff and play the race card to get it. Affirmative action is a result of Drapetomaniacs demanding a level playing field. The Voting Rights Act is a result of uppity Black sufferers of the illness asking for constitutional rights. Appeasing those sick voices is part of the cure for Drapetomania. Instituting affirmative action hasn’t erased the disparity in Black vs White employment rates. Voter ID laws and gerrymandering is a legal workaround to the Voting Rights Act. It’s also why Lakeisha has been at the company for three years longer than you, has an advanced degree, but hasn’t received a promotion. When she asks for a raise, they’ll give it to her because the way to stop Drapetomania from advancing, according to Dr. Cartwright is: If the white man attempts to oppose the Deity’s will, by trying to make the negro anything else than “the submissive knee-bender” (which the Almighty declared he should be), by trying to raise him to a level with himself, or by putting himself on an equality with the negro; or if he abuses the power which God has given him over his fellow-man, by being cruel to him, or punishing him in anger, or by neglecting to protect him from the wanton abuses of his fellow-servants and all others, or by denying him the usual comforts and necessaries of life, the negro will run away; but if he keeps him in the position that we learn from the Scriptures he was intended to occupy, that is, the position of submission; and if his master or overseer be kind and gracious in his hearing towards him, without condescension, and at the same time ministers to his physical wants, and protects him from abuses, the negro is spell-bound, and cannot run away. Stage 4: The Escape – When acute Drapetomania hits, your Black friend will become very belligerent. You’ll think they are crazy, and they are. Drapetomaniacs don’t give a fuck. They are tired of being whipped. It might manifest itself as a single slave sneaking off into the night headed north towards freedom. Everyone has a breaking point, and a Stage 4 Drapetomania sufferer might do something crazy like jump on a man who is 100 lbs heavier and armed with a gun for following him through a Sanford, Florida neighborhood. There are even stories of a man who ran away from a Baltimore Police Officer simply because he had committed no crime and feared for his safety! I know it sounds illogical (because why would a police officer kill an innocent man?), but that’s how mental illnesses like this work. Stage 5. The Slave Revolt – Every few generations, Drapetomania spreads through an entire community and the entire group decides to grab pitchforks and machetes aso they can “get free.” Cinque did it on a slave ship. Toussaint Louverture did it in Haiti. Denmark Vessey did it in South Carolina. They did it in Ferguson, Missouri. They did it in Baltimore. It will happen again. This is the stage everyone should fear because it makes no sense. Even though those Drapetomaniacs don’t own those plantations or CVS’s, people will still ask why they are setting fires, why they are in such a frenzy or even why they are burning down their own neighborhoods. The answer is simple. Either: a. For half a millennium Black people who didn’t know each other, who lived in different places and in different generations have all coincidentally, but independently, grown tired and angry from centuries of being marginalized, abused and given the scraps from the table of a system that sucks their energy, culture and life while stiff-arming them away from any real American progress, or b. Black people are crazy.

#### Specifically, activism that forefronts the political agenda of black communities is treated as pathological psychosis. Rather than relieving structural conditions, black people are encouraged to pull themselves up by their bootstraps and commit themselves to political and social institutions in order to cure their Drapetomania and become fully functioning citizens.

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“Mainstream culture…defines threats to racial order as a form of madness that is, still, overwhelmingly located in the minds and bodies of black [people].” –Jonathan Metzl On September 28th, television host Bill Maher tweeted that “#colinkapernick [sic] is a f\*\*king idiot” after the 49ers quarterback voiced his disappointment with both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton on the basis that their campaigns are “trying to debate who is less racist.” Maher’s choice of invective has proven popular among those who disapprove of Colin Kaepernick’s critique of white supremacy. Delegitimizing black protest by labeling its expressions as “idiocy” is not new. Since the very invention of the ideology of race, white people have struggled to accept black social protest on its own terms. Instead, white people have often marshaled the language of science to attribute black resistance to various forms of derangement, stupidity, and psychosis in an effort to delegitimize its critique of white supremacy. In fact, the endurance of white supremacy rests in its ability to construct, define, and police the boundaries of black pathology in the very moments in which it perceives deep challenges to its stability and legitimacy. When black protest threatens white supremacy, white “science” steps in. The history of pathologizing black resistance to white oppression has its roots in the practice of U.S. slavery. Nineteenth century medical diagnoses, for instance, often reflected white slave-holding interests in the context of black protest and revolt. In 1851, Samuel A. Cartwright, a New Orleans physician and Confederate loyalist, published his “Report on the Disease and the Physical Peculiarities of the Negro Race” in which he argued that high rates of physical and mental illnesses afflicting black persons were products of the supposed biologically inferior mental capacity of the “black race.” In this report, Cartwright introduced what he called “Drapetomania,” known as the “Disease Causing Slaves to Run Away.” He claimed that Drapetomania was curable except in “slaves [who are] located on the borders of a free State, within a stone’s throw of the abolitionists.” Interestingly, Cartwright offered no explanation as to why these particular enslaved black communities could not be “cured” of their “mental “illness” and thereby continued to flee northward toward freedom. While “kindness”—keeping one’s property well-fed, clothed, providing enough fuel to keep the enslaved warm at night, and so forth—was the prescribed antidote to the “disease,” Cartwright nonetheless warned that “if any one or more of them, at any time, are inclined to raise their heads to a level with their master or overseer…they should be punished until they fall into [a] submissive state….’” Cartwright, in other words, viewed Drapetomania as a mental “illness” that could be beaten out of those who resisted enslavement. In the immediate aftermath of slavery, everyone from physicians to scholars and politicians sought to explain the supposed high-rates of diseases, most notably tuberculosis, among black communities. According to historian Tera Hunter, “Race handicapped affluent blacks because they could not withstand the excessive ‘mental strain’ necessary to emulate the ‘higher degree of civilization’ and good health of ‘the better class of their white neighbors.’” The “diseases” of black communities were therefore the black bodies physically breaking down because they could not handle the responsibilities of freedom. In the early twentieth century, black resistance was described as disease through the eugenics discourse of idiocy. Terms such as “idiot” and “moron” emerged to classify those unfit for civic life and to justify deportation, institutionalization, or sterilization. Both terms were used to police the project of white (Anglo, Nordic) race preservation. The terms “idiot” and “moron” entered into our nation’s lexicon in 1910. At the annual meeting of the American Association for the Study of the Feeble-Minded, held in May of that year, racial eugenicist Henry Goddard proposed a taxonomic system—“idiot-imbecile-moron”—for classifying individuals with “mental retardation” based on an intelligence quotient (IQ). Goddard ascribed the term “idiot” to those with a mental age of less than three years. Moreover, he applied the term “imbecile” to those with a mental age of 3 to 7. A “moron,” in Goddard’s estimation, was best reserved for those with a mental age of 7 to 10. All three terms fell under the broad category of “feeble-mindedness.” Goddard’s typology also corresponded with precise IQ ranges: In 1917, Goddard was tapped to serve on the U.S. Army’s Alpha and Beta Testing Team, a research body that conducted intelligence tests on over 1.7 million soldiers. A few years later, Goddard and his team published the results in their book, Psychology Examining in the United States Army. Whereas Goddard and his cohort found that 47 percent of whites from southern and eastern European countries could be classified as morons, they alleged that 89 percent of black soldiers fell into the same category. But the timing of the report’s publication is curious especially given the prominent role black veterans played in resisting white lynch mob violence in the immediate aftermath of the war. In 1919, whites who were upset by black migration from the rural south to the urban north began a lynching campaign of near-historic proportions. According to the Library of Congress, at least 76 black Americans were lynched that year alone. In the war’s immediate aftermath black veterans were often at the forefront of these violent confrontations. During the bloody “Red Summer” of 1919 in Chicago, Washington D.C., and Elaine, Arkansas and again three years later in Tulsa, Oklahoma demobilized black veterans used their combat experience and tactical and organizational knowledge to resist oppression in their communities. Alleging that 89 percent of black soldiers—and therefore black veterans—were morons, one can argue, served as a way of undermining their resistance to lynch mobs and the destruction of black communities. The delegitimization of black protest was again on display in 1968 at the height of the Black Power era when eminent psychiatrists Walter Bromberg and Frank Simon dreamed up a diagnosis—“protest psychosis”—that described Black power as a form of “delusional anti-whiteness.” Four years later, in “Symbolism in Protest Psychosis,” they forcefully described that malady as “a psychotic illness with strong elements of racial hostility and black nationalism [that entails] the release of previously repressed anti-white feelings, which combine with African ideology and beliefs.” In short, “[the illness is oriented toward] reversing the white supremacy tradition or stating an objection to the accepted superiority of white values in terms of an African ideology.” During the same period, and in keeping with Bromberg and Simon’s thesis, the idea of schizophrenia shifted from a condition historically associated with “white feminine docility” to that of “angry black masculinity.” In his compelling text, The Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia Became a Black Disease, Dr. Johnathan Metzl demonstrated how schizophrenia’s new clinical parameters were signaled in the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) published in 1968. Schizophrenia, he argued, was reorganized as a “disorder of masculinized belligerence” through the language of hostility and aggression. According to Metzl, the diagnosis “mirrored the social context of its origins in ways that enabled users to knowingly or unknowingly pathologize protest as mental illness [or cognitive deficiency].” Contemporary attempts to delegitimize black protest as “idiocy” reflects the scientific discourse of pathology that has been evident in white critiques of black resistance for decades. Arguing that black protest is grounded in derangement, stupidity, and psychosis is precisely what allows white people to sidestep the actual content of black activists’ demands. Perhaps we can begin to understand and to respect black resistance by affirming that Colin Kaepernick is not an idiot; that black veterans fighting lynch mobs were not morons; that enslaved men and women who ran away were not diseased; and that the unwavering demand to be regarded as “fully human” in the eyes of the state does not signal a psychotic break. To the contrary, black protest, in all its forms, fundamentally challenges white supremacy and affirms blackness as fundamental to the fabric of our democratic society in the making.

#### Logics of Drapetomania extend to punish black people in academic spaces. Any attempt to move outside the boundaries of “normal” behavior is met with either fake niceties or outright hostilities. Addressing this pathologization requires exposing the terms of normalcy that undergird expectations of students and academics.

Powell 99

William N. Powell, PhD in Education at Oregon State University, Structural Oppression of African Americans in Higher Education <file:///C:/Users/sharris/Downloads/PowellWilliamN1999.pdf>

Expanding on the issues raised in the last chapter, this chapter will present a critical overview of how the development of past pathological theories has affected the African American in the system of higher education. My purpose will be to show, through my research and personal experiences, how higher education has helped to create a pathological myth about African Americans that has hindered their ability to succeed. I will attempt to summarize all relevant research on this subject by using three central themes, each of which has implications that go far beyond the halls of education. First, I will propose that the oppressors, having convinced themselves of the normalcy of their pathological views, have fostered acquiescence, self-denial, anger, and rage among African American students, faculty, and staff in higher education. Second, to add to and support this argument, I will present empirical evidence that suggests that the oppressors' curriculum, in higher education, along with their pathological views, has negatively influenced African Americans' behavior and ability to learn. Finally, I will propose that the pathology that I spoke about in the last chapter has become so pervasive in higher education, that it has, in effect, undermined the African American's ability to perform academically. These findings should 67 indicate the importance of moving beyond the historiography of the oppressors' pathological influence in higher education so that new models can be incorporated. The Pathological Myth about African Americans in Higher Education A normal Negro child, having grown up within a normal family, will become abnormal on the slightest contact with the white world (Fanon, Black Skin, White Mask 143). Normalcy has always been assumed by the oppressors as a given. In their minds, 'normal' is how they identify themselves. Those who do not fit the oppressors' definition of normal are considered abnormal and thus pathological. Thomas and Sillen confirm this by stating: White racism has improvised a thousand variations on two basic themes. The first is that black people are born with inferior brains and a limited capacity for mental growth. The second is that their personality tends to be abnormal, whether by nature or by nurture. . . . Both have served to sanctify a hierarchical social order in which 'the Negro's place' is forever ordained by his genes and the accumulated disabilities of his past (1). According to Ivan Illich in his book Medical Nemesis, `norma' in Latin meant square, as in a carpenter's square, to be transformed in English into 'normal' which came to designate conformity to a common type or person (161). During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this word took on both a medical and a social connotation. To be normal is to be healthy, as defined by the oppressors, both physically and psychologically. The oppressors' reality dictates that the world is made up of polar opposites, i.e., good-bad, right-wrong, black-white. Because the oppressors have defined themselves as 68 `normal' and thus white, they have labeled African Americans, whom they see as opposite, or blacks being 'abnormal.' They had become so obsessed by justifying the African Americans" abnormal' position in society, that when their assertions were either challenged or found to be without foundation, they would simply create new pathologies to support and justify their perceptions. For instance, the oppressors would create maladies, as mentioned earlier, that only African Americans could have like 'Negritude' (an illness caused by leprosy which turns skin black); `drapetomania' (flight-from-home madness); or dysaesthesia Aethiopica' (insensibility of nerves and hebetude of mind).' The oppressors' pathological improvisations became the foundation of such `scientific' notions as racially determined intelligence, along with a myriad of genetic assumptions that later led to the eugenic movements. These new "scientifically" improvised labels allowed the oppressors to justify the many barriers that they had erected in order to keep African Americans from becoming active and productive members in society. Ironically, this method of inducing mythological illnesses can also be traced back to ancient Greece. The Greeks even had a word for itlatrogenesis.' Iatrogenesis, according to Ivan Illich, is a way in which physicians induced nonexistent illnesses. lllich contends that physicians have turned health care into a sick-making enterprise (ix). I contend that the oppressors have turned higher education into a normalizing enterprise. Just as physicians pathologized the patient, educators are actively pathologizing, in this instance, African Americans. I suggested earlier that the origin of "race" pathology came out of Greek culture, later becoming endemic in Western thought. Out of this came the oppressors' idea of superiority and their self-righteous belief that they can label others who differ from them as 69 pathological. In order to validate these labels, the oppressors have reified abstract numbers and concepts such as IQ and intelligence. In this way, the oppressors have been able to induce iatrogenic labels in order to judge an entire population. According to Illich, "medicine cannot be practiced without the iatrogenic creation of disease" (36). I contend that higher education, as it now exists, cannot be practiced without the iatrogenic creation of pathological 'race' labels. Along with these labels, the oppressors have constructed theories to support their assumptions. These 'race' theories, as they have come to be called, have been infused into the curriculum of higher education and have acted as knowledge-based barriers against those who do not fit the definition of normal. Illich clarifies this point by saying, "In very society, medicine, like law and religion, defines what is normal, proper, or desirable. Medicine has the authority to label one man's [sic] complaint a legitimate illness, to declare a second man sick though he himself does not complain, and to refuse a third social recognition of his pain, his disability, and even his death" (37-8). In like manner, I would argue that education in general, and higher education in particular, defines what is normal, proper, or desirable, and legitimizes it to fit the oppressors' pathology. Education has the authority to label the oppressors' reality as normal and thus legitimate, while declaring others' realities, such as African Americans', as abnormal and thus illegitimate. In addition, education refuses to recognize the legitimate anger and frustration of African Americans by labeling their reactions abnormal, which is brought on by their inferiority and their inability to fit in. Illich tells us that as full time specialists use medicine to control large populations by means of bureaucratic institutions, educators also control large populations of students in institutions of higher education (39). He tells us that the medical profession owes its 70 supreme authority to the medical schools. I concur and would add that the educational profession, like the medical profession, owes their supreme authority to higher education. Illich goes on to say that "Only doctors 'know' what constitutes sickness, who is sick, and what shall be done to the sick and to those whom they consider at a special risk" (39) [Illich's emphasis]. Paradoxically, the oppressors tell us that only educator know what constitutes knowledge, who is to be educated and what shall be done with those that they consider a 'special risk.' The oppressors' use of iatrogenic labeling in higher education has caused African Americans, who are the oppressors' abnormal model, to become angered and outraged (Thomas and Sillen 54). The oppressors define the African Americans' reaction to their having been labeled as a symptom of their 'abnormal' pathology. Thomas and Sullen, however, have argued that the African Americans' anger and rage is "a sign of health, not pathology." They go on to say that when an African American is perceived as being in a state of 'blind rage,' running amok,' or being 'impulsively violent,' the oppressors misinterpret their acts or actions as being "excessive" and "inappropriate" (54). For reasons that are beyond most African Americans' comprehension, the oppressors' own pathological `mind-set' cannot grasp or fully comprehend a healthy African American reaction to their labels. Within the oppressors' way of thinking, to be a healthy African American, by definition, is an oxymoron. Thomas and Sullen are not alone in assuming that the African Americans' rage and anger is healthy. Two black psychiatrists, Grier and Cobbs, have also supported this premise by writing: 71 People bear all they can and, if required, bear even more. But if they are black in present-day America, they have been asked to shoulder too much. They have had all they can stand. They will be harried no more. . . . In order to survive, the black man [and woman] has had to develop "cultural paranoia, in which every white man [and woman] is a potential enemy unless [they] personally find out differently. . . . Allied with this cultural paranoia are 'cultural depression, "cultural masochism,' and 'cultural antisocialism' . . . and clinicians [along with educators] who are interested in the psychological functioning of black people must get acquainted with this body of character traits which we call the Black Norm (qtd. by Thomas and Sillen 54). In my opinion, the oppressors' institutions of higher education have become blinded by their own pathological idea of what is normal. They are unable to analyze their unethical `racist' beliefs because of their ways of defining normal, which draws into question the oppressors' morality. The oppressors, particularly in higher education, have become, to quote Illich, "monuments of narcissistic scientism and concrete manifestations of their own professional prejudice" (40).

#### The legacy of the plantation is prevalent in the University. Structural anti-blackness manifests itself through a process that forces students of color to assimilate themselves to white values and white methods of learning.

Green 16

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At schools across the country, from the University of Missouri to Ithaca College to Stanford, students of color are showing that they feel disconnected from their respective schools, that implicit yet institutionalized racism creates emotional distance between them and their white peers and faculty. Being a black student on a predominantly white campus certainly doesn’t guarantee that the student will develop mental-health issues. However, various studies suggest that perceived or actual discrimination can make it hard for students of color to engage with their campus in the way that their white peers do. In his 1992 article in The Atlantic, “Race and the Schooling of Black Americans,” Claude M. Steele explains: The basic assimilationist offer that schools make to blacks: You can be valued and rewarded in school (and society), the schools say to these students, but you must first master the culture and ways of the American mainstream, and since that mainstream (as it is represented) is essentially white, this means you must give up many particulars of being black—styles of speech and appearance, value priorities, preferences—at least in mainstream settings. This is asking a lot … For too many black students school is simply the place where, more concertedly, persistently, and authoritatively than anywhere else in society, they learn how little valued they are. For minority students, surviving and thriving academically despite multiple encounters with racism or stereotyping may require a different type of resolve than do typical college-student struggles like balancing work and class, or overcoming difficult assignments. W.E.B. Du Bois coined the concept of “double consciousness,” whereby a black people are essentially forced to have two identities and pressured to view themselves as they’re perceived by their non-black peers. That psychology can create a unique circumstance for black students today—a psychology some researchers argue may even lead to mental-health problems that go unnoticed.

Challenging institutional norms in higher education is a prerequisite to health

Giles 2015

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The phrase and concept of "chilly climate," within the higher education context, has been around for over 20 years (Sandler, 1988) and used most often to describe the experiences and perceptions of groups of women and people of color (Altbach & Lomotoy, 1991; Bartlett & O'Barr, 1990; *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 2005; Greene & Stockard. 2010; Maranto & Griffin, 2011). I Find the term and ideas behind it illustrating a non-threatening and almost benign critique of pervasive racist and sexist institutional policies. It can represent an acceptable and "nice" way to say, "There is racism and sexism happening here, however, you can tolerate it. "A cultural climate can be "chilly," yet manageable, sustainable, and only slightly uncomfortable. The concept conjures up images of the acceptance of certain levels of racism and sexism. That, in and of itself, is problematic. I believe it is important not to acclimate to or accept a chilly climate, especially if the "chill" represents racism, sexism, or systemic oppression. The better social justice oriented approach is to resist, analyze, work for change and improvement, or at the least, practice self- defense from that uncomfortable cultural climate. In most of the literature on this topic, the concept connects: to the unwelcoming Cultural and social environments encountered by some and/or many women and some and/or many ‘people of color in primarily white institutions. The concept usually addresses the dearth of sense of belongingness and even the overt sexist and racist actions (e.g., micro- and macro-.aggressions) members of marginalized groups perceive within their higher education journeys. My view is that the concept oversimplifies the deeply troubling and personally harmful effects experienced by some women and people of color who pursue their degrees in careers and environments skillful in the art of maintaining the status quo while making critics and even protestors for change feel degrees of comfort in an uncomfortable environment.

#### Vote affirmative to endorse epistemic disobedience in debate

Amsler & Facer 17 Sarah Amsler Associate Professor in Education, University of Nottingham,, Keri Facer Graduate School of Education, Futures UniversityContesting anticipatory regimes in education: exploring alternative educational orientations to the futureVolume 94, November 2017, Pages 6-14,

In the theories and practices made public by these projects, we find neither a desire to colonize the future through its algorithmic induction nor a resignation to abandoning it to power or chance, but pedagogies, curricula and modes of governance which are designed to enlarge spaces of possibility to participate in autonomous and common forms of life. Here there is a refusal to play the game of the anticipatory regime − no individualised target-setting, strategic planning or algorithmic risk assessments − and a commitment to ‘delink’ from such regimes of epistemic and social control in order to enlarge the space of emergence for liberatory alternatives. While each of these un/learning projects is singular to its own social and historical context, educational researchers who traverse between them suggest that all are distinguished by how they engage with learning and the future in ways that are ‘not tamed, reduced, abstracted or detached’ but rather through methods that start ‘from our whole being and within our network of relationships with others, humans, non-human beings and things’, and how they articulate an ‘existential, embodied and non-future-oriented understanding and experience of hope’ (Mandell, 2014). This mode of critical anticipation is positioned geopolitically in the margins and exteriorities of a world system that is otherwise represented as the only possible horizon of global knowledge politics. Here, abstract concepts of time and ‘universal’ criteria of value co-exist with many others, including those which are invisible and unrealized (Grosfoguel, 2012). This perspective discloses the historical and geopolitical specificity − and interrupts the normalisation − of the repressive anticipatory regimes which are active in British education today. As Raymundo Sánchez Barraza, General Co-ordinator of the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Comprehensive Indigenous Training Center (CIDECI Las Casas) in Mexico, explained: ‘we positioned ourselves from the beginning on the margins of prophetic critique, vis-à-vis history, vis-à-vis the world, vis-à-vis the demands of the minorities, the despised, conquered peoples…’. It is a ‘shoeless university just from below’ (2005). The starting point for this critical anticipation emerges from the experience of violence. It starts from the impossibility of rational ‘anticipation’, as experienced by those who have historically been denied possibilities for self-determination through the interweaving of epistemic technologies with colonial oppression (Grosfoguel, 2013; Mignolo, 2000). The ambition of learners here is not to optimize their capacities to fulfil a predetermined future, particularly that of colonizing ‘progress’ which has annihilated indigenous people, lands, languages, knowledges and ways of life. Rather, it demands a kind of radical critique that the Argentine decolonial semiotician Walter Mignolo calls ‘epistemic disobedience’. This is not a skill that can be learned through demonstrating ‘progress’ in learning against nationally standardized learning targets and outcomes; it requires the unlearning of what is presently required for inclusion and success in this system. Epistemic disobedience is not a method for more of the recognition or competitive advantage that promises fleeting future securities in a marketized anticipatory regime, but a ‘definitive rejection of “being told” from the epistemic privileges of the zero point what “we” are, what our ranking is in relation to the ideal of humanitas and what we have to do to be recognized as such’ (Mignolo, 2009). The epistemologies and technologies of the neoliberal anticipatory regime described earlier in this paper are excellent examples of the violence of a ‘naturalized grammar of colonial modernity’ which promotes certainty and linear causality, universal reason, teleology and linear time, the coherence of the Cartesian subject, the historical progression of a single humanity which can be reduced to standardized measures of evaluation, and the salvation of ontological, economic and political security within a framework of domination (Andreotti, 2015). The pressing question for educators working against the colonization of the future by dominating social systems, however, is not how to minimize future risks to the advancement of these logics, but ‘whether the world is going to survive’ despite them and how to resist and survive the destruction of worlds in the present. From this point of departure, Barraza (2005) remarked, ‘we’re going by another path, not by this world’s path with its model of profits, marketing, exploitation, greed, control, contempt for the different’. It is a path of learning and organizing autonomy and democracy, and creating conditions for new possibilities even − or especially − when these remain unknown and as yet unhoped for. Co-founder of the associated University of the Earth, Gustavo Esteva, elaborates this anti-instrumental relationship between learning and the future through the words of the dissident novelist and former Czech president Vaclav Havel, not as ‘joy when things are going well or willingness to invest in enterprises that are obviously headed for early success, but rather an ability to work for something to succeed’ and to value this process ‘regardless of how it turns out’, because it is this process, less so than the outcome, which ‘gives us strength to live and to continually try new things, even in conditions that seem as hopeless as ours do, here and now’ (Havel, cited by Esteva, in Mandell, 2014). This form of relating to the future allows for us to not predict or know the world in advance, but rather to be ‘shocked' by it in the present, so that educational opportunity means making sense and embracing radically new perspectives, ideas and challenges without “falling back into habits” of interpretation or domesticating them with scientifically rationalities (Mandell, 2014).

#### Efforts to confine black politics to conformity within conventional liberal politics is part of an agenda of pathologization that must be rejected.

Hesse & Hooker 17 Barnor Hesse is Associate Professor of African American Studies, Political Science, and Sociology at Northwestern University. uliet Hooker is Associate Professor of Government and African and African Diaspora Studies at the University of Texas at Austin Introduction: On Black Political Thought inside Global Black Protest The South Atlantic Quarterly 116:3, July 2017 doi 10.1215/00382876-3961428

Recent global trends in the policing deaths and antipolicing protests of black people urge a reconsideration of the orientations and scope of black political thought. One of its central considerations must be black politics and its anticolonial/antiracial conditions of possibility. This is because the solidarity logics of blackness implicated in the signifier “black politics” continue to be insurgent in and repressed by Western capitalist, liberal democratic polities. Our understanding of the social, cultural, and existential oppositional activities among dispersed populations of African descent has been largely derived from black antislavery/ anticolonial/antiracial mobilizations spanning the sixteenth to twenty-first centuries. Nevertheless, it remains the case that black politics appears to be one of the least elucidated and most contested concepts in contemporary political discourse. This is partly because whatever has been represented and configured as black politics has also been routinely marginalized, pathologized, repudiated, or attacked in Western political theory and Western polities. Delineating and contributing to a distinctive field of black political thought has always required that we recuperate conceptually the Western-attributed outlaw status of black politics. Here the task also becomes thinking through the constitutively fugitive formations of black politics, tracking them as they cut into, interrupt, and expose the modern capitalist, liberal democratic tradition of representing the Western polity outside of its colonial-racial gestations. Thinking about black politics in this way also requires being attentive to revealing and analyzing the repressions, repudiations, and violations of black politics in the Western colonial-racial order of things and populations. This approach, however, cannot be developed without recognizing that political mobilizations of “blackness” have always had different and dispersed meanings across time and space (e.g., in North America, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Europe). It entails understanding different political forms of blackness as territorialization, where dissenting meanings and oppositional practices are inscribed in solidarities tied to particular events, debates, or situations within historical attachments to particular social boundaries (e.g., nations, cities, and histories).1 At the same time, we need to think about different political forms of blackness as deterritorialization. 2 This involves the creative disembedding of particular meanings of black solidarity from local events and settings, where these meanings become transferable to other places, linking previously disparate black communities in affinity and dialogical networks of discourses and activities. Since 2014 this political dynamic of territorialization and deterritorialization has increasingly become a mainstay in the proliferation of mobilizations against the violence of racial policing across the black diaspora under the political slogan “Black lives matter.” Against Western Normative Thought How does our approach to black political thought think about the critique registered by various manifestations of black politics? In a revelatory sense, black politics is symptomatic of Western hegemony as white supremacy. Its incidence reveals formations of race and coloniality within Western polities that are regularly disavowed by Western normative thought. This means that black politics is structurally possible only in relation to Western normative regimes whose liberal-democratic-capitalist institutions are embedded in racial/colonial histories and formations belied by Western normative institutions. This has important consequences for how we understand the provenance of black political thought in relation to the Western polity. It means recognizing that, historically, unlike the Renaissance, the Reformation, or the Enlightenment in Western normative thought, antislavery, anticolonialism, and antiracism have yet to be considered significant to theorizing modern Western political categories, identities, and formations. At the same time, we have yet to fully explore how radical interventions and ideas introduced by black politics (e.g., white supremacy, racial capitalism, black bodily integrity, and black fugitivity) have confronted and exposed the conceptual insufficiency of Western normative thought. Schematically, Western normative thought works through categories that presuppose a universal hegemony of Western values (e.g., liberalism’s humanist and edifying version of modernity), while treating race as an exception to the episteme of its normative rule. In oppositional distinction, the “black radical tradition” (Robinson 1983) acts as a site of critical thought. It provincializes and problematizes the idea of Western normativity, reinhabiting it with a critical marking and interrogation of modernity’s colonial foundations, thereby conceptualizing race as constitutive of the episteme of Western normative rule. Western critical thought is subversive of the colonial-racial foundations of Western hegemony and white supremacy. The intellectual challenge for the Western critical enterprise of black political thought is analogous to what has been suggested by Edouard Glissant for Caribbean thought in comprehending the dislocating impact of Atlantic slavery on any conventional sense of historical continuity and contemporary presence in social, cultural, and political formations. It becomes imperative to question any intellectual genre of divisions that might fracture the different possibilities of analytical and diasporic coherence in the contextual study of black politics and to develop an openness to “all the perspectives of the human sciences,” challenging these divisions and their “inherited categories” where they constitute a potential “obstacle to a daring new methodology” (Glissant 1989: 65). The aim is to generate alternative, critical interventions that inaugurate “a revaluation of the conventions of analytical thought” (65). That revaluation is important because black political thought shares much of the same analytical vocabulary as Western normative thought, as well as breaking with its normativity. Consequently, it becomes necessary to avoid any disabling collusions with political analyses inherited from conventions that have routinely dismissed critiques of their racial and colonial formations. This is what epitomizes the Western critical thinking of Cedric Robinson, Sylvia Wynter, Angela Davis, Stuart Hall, Hortense Spillers, Paul Gilroy, Saidiya Hartman, and Achille Mbembe. Each of these thinkers, in different ways, can be drawn on to explain how the national, classed, gendered, diasporic, black political subject, in its territorialized and deterritorialized incarnations, navigates and contests the violations and oppressions of Western normative ideals and institutions conventionally conceptualized as exterior to each other (e.g., humanism and racism). The Western polity is confronted by black political thought’s exposure of it obscuring and denying its imbrication in the liberal and the colonial, democracy and race, universalism and Eurocentrism. Specifying and interrogating the resilient entanglements of race, its colonial disciplinary dynamics and hegemonic discourses of disavowal in Western polities continues to mark resistances to the shared and inherited black diasporic problem of racial subordination and racial violence, racially constrained democratic incorporation, and racially hypervisual exoticization in sports and entertainment (Iton 2008; Carrington 2010). All of this confronts black political thought today as much as it did during the early twentieth century. Reconstructed Blackness The principal metaphor of W. E. B. DuBois’s Black Reconstruction in America ([1935] 1998) remains instructive for our version of black political thought. DuBois’s reexamination of the politics of the Reconstruction period of American history (1860–80) is a radical critique of the Western institution of democracy in its racial form and idiom. To demonstrate this, DuBois foregrounds the subordinated black activist experience as the political lens through which to view the events of Reconstruction and its subsequent white historiography. He describes various circumstances in which the political and educational activities undertaken by the black population had been deemed a contaminant of the white institutional legitimation of US democracy, whether the black persons involved were enslaved or free. DuBois also noted that the actual participation of black people in the democratic institutions of Reconstruction, whether through voting, elections, assembly deliberations, or lawmaking, desired to go beyond the kind of freedom made racially available as an unprotected and unguaranteed citizenship by the federal government because it was antagonistic to the racial kind of democracy defined as representative of a modern nation-state. DuBois was aware that black politics ran counter to the white institution of US democracy. That countering emerged because, while slavery had been a constitutive part of democracy in the United States, its abolition now raised the black political question, how does one emancipate democracy from the white jurisdiction of race? It was in relation to that kind of question that DuBois ([1935] 1998: 721) provides us with his rationale for black political thought, where he writes: “The chief witness in Reconstruction, the emancipated slave himself, has been almost barred from court. His written Reconstruction record has been largely destroyed and nearly always neglected. . . . In other words, every effort has been made to treat the Negro’s part in Reconstruction with silence and contempt.” Of course, the masculine idiom in which DuBois specified the Negro as the black political subject requires constant interrogation, interruption, and displacement. This should be borne in mind when drawing on DuBois’s understanding of two theoretical problems posed for black political thought. First, there was the “racial revolution” of an expanded democracy in the United States following the Civil War, the abolition of slavery, and the short-lived egalitarian possibilities of Reconstruction. This had created and legitimated a white democracy in its practices, if not in its discourses. Second, there was the reemergent white democracy predicated on a disavowal of black politics in its administrative forms and the administrative removal of black populations from deepening their social participation in democracy. This had resulted in the discrediting of black politics. For DuBois ([1935] 1998: 715), the disavowal of black politics began with the white political and intellectual erasure of the significance of black people’s struggles to resist, escape, and abolish slavery, in an “attempt to enter democracy.” For DuBois, the displacement of black politics from US political history and discourse was motivated by the desire to avoid any racial disruption to institutional arrangements that privileged the normativity of white hegemony. The politics of the ex-slaves presaged an insistence that democracy be transformed by the eradication of white hegemony and its expansion through black self-representation and participation. It suggested that race was constitutively structural in Western liberal democracy and that black politics existed in a relation of racial antagonism with the Western polity. Through this approach to conceptualizing black politics DuBois was also struggling to explain the Western performative political script of racially governing black populations through the imbricated rule of liberalism-colonialism and democracy whiteness, while formally representing these imbricated aspects of race through governance as if they were constitutionally separate and incommensurable. We can perhaps read the metaphor black reconstruction as evoking black politics in a symptomatic reading of the racial political form of the polity and society it confronted, which could not be deduced from the lexicon of US democracy and Western normative thought. Black politics was symptomatic of a white constitutive logic that ensured that Western democracy was underlined by its repression of a black politics that sought to transform or counteract it. In short, for DuBois black politics exposed the normalized white administration of a democratic regime, which became visible when confronted by the black politics that challenged it. As we will see, this metaphor of black reconstruction continues to resonate both contemporaneously and globally. Contemporary Global Black Protest The longue durée of black politics has been grounded in its reactions to the imbrication of the liberal-democratic and the colonial-racial in Western political formations. However, despite our apparent transition to the postcolonial and post–civil rights eras, Western states continue to reproduce and disavow the grounds for black politics. The question of the racial emancipation of democracy, or indeed its decolonization, therefore, recurrently poses irrepressible predicaments for black political thought. A half century after most states in Africa achieved independence and the civil rights movement in the United States succeeded in ending Jim Crow racial segregation, and a quarter century after black South Africans overthrew apartheid, renewed black protest movements around the globe are beginning to question the forms and aims of black politics and the limits of liberal democracy. Globally, black protest movements originating from local concerns are responding in different ways to the inability of liberal democracy to deliver robust racial justice and inviolable equal rights, drawing attention to the unfinished project of decolonization and the unrelenting dehumanization of black lives resulting from the precarity induced by global white supremacy (however much the latter may have morphed). A global wave of black protest is legible from uprisings against police violence in the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, France, Canada, and Israel and from student protests in South Africa.3 A common thread in Western normative critiques of the disruptive tactics deployed by these black protesters is the notion that black rage is counterproductive and that it needs to be disciplined and contained in order to gain the legitimation of representative democracy. However, by focusing on the political experiences of those whom Anthony Bogues (2012) calls its “living corpses,” we see that democracy has always been unrepresentative and incomplete because its racial denial of political rights to some—rather than being a contradiction of its core principles—has instead underwritten the white privileged ability of others to claim such rights. The key insight of the black politics developing in these protests centers on marking Western democracy’s white limits. At the same time, it also points to one of the fundamental paradoxes of black politics, namely, the invariable futility of directing activism toward a racially governing regime historically founded on the constitutive exclusion and violation of blackness. Meditating on the meaning of black politics in the postcolonial independence, post–civil rights, postapartheid era, Richard Iton (2008: 30–31) suggests that a “steady rhetorical retreat . . . has characterized black politics since the Cold War,” marked by “the celebration of pragmatism, instrumentalism, and compromise . . . and the rhetorical shunning and shaming of protest activities.” Iton highlights the poverty of political imagination exhibited by forms of black politics circumscribed by modern/colonial formations whose aim was inclusion within existing state structures and dominant subject formations. For us, this means that the pressing question in black politics is no longer civil separation versus civil integration, if indeed it ever was, but rather the foreclosure of more radical and transformative visions by acceptance of an improved version of the liberal democratic status quo as the limited horizon of political philosophy and political possibility. Faced with such a resilient conjuncture, Iton suggests that we need to move beyond “the predominance of the state as the sole frame for . . . progressive and transformative discourse and mobilization” (17). In his view, this means moving away from exclusive reliance on the formal arena of Western politics and reinvigorating the subversive and anarchic practices of black popular culture to cultivate more emancipatory and transformative political imaginaries. While our aim here is not to suggest that black politics should retreat entirely from the formally political, following Iton we do want to suggest that we need to think against and in excess of the centrality of the state as the horizon of political intelligibility. One problem with state-and-rights-centric forms of black political activism is that their discourse becomes fixated on the state’s responsibility to resolve its own failures to create and institutionalize racial justice. They promote a bizarre turn to the Western state as the ultimate safeguard of rights it has historically and racially denied. Indeed, to view it as the protector of rights given its long history as the source of violence against black citizens is almost perverse. Moreover, replacing bodies phenotypically marked as white with those phenotypically marked as black in elected office does not magically transform the racial character of the state (Goldberg 2001). These strategic limitations of formal modes of black politics have been starkly exposed by protest movements in South Africa and the United States. For example, in 2016 the protests of black schoolgirls in South Africa against the failure to decolonize South African education at all levels was captured by the hashtag #StopRacismAtPretoriaGirlsHigh, which quickly went viral. The photographs and videos of young black girls proudly wearing Afros and facing off against adult white school administrators who had deemed natural hairstyles “untidy” or “barbaric” sparked global support far beyond South Africa and eventually led Ministry of Education officials to intervene and suspend the discriminatory hairstyle regulations. Yet the belated state action spurred by the global outcry following the black schoolgirls’ protest was that of a South African state that has been dominated by a majority-black political party, the African National Congress (ANC), since the end of apartheid. The handover of political power to a predominantly black party did not radically transform the material conditions of poor, black South Africans, nor did it fundamentally alter the Eurocentric premises of educational institutions. T. O. Molefe (2016: 32) has argued that the ideas articulated by the #FeesMustFall university student protesters represented “a departure from the nonracial conciliatory ‘Rainbow Nation’ project of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, [Nelson] Mandela, and the ANC and a new way of grappling with the outcomes of a history of patriarchy, slavery, imperialism, colonialism, white supremacy, and capitalism.” South Africa’s black student protests emphasized “anti-orthodoxy, solidarity, and revolution” (32), thereby questioning the meaning of state power and envisioning more revolutionary forms of black politics. Meanwhile, in the United States it could be argued that one of the reasons the Black Lives Matter protests against gratuitous and disproportionate police violence (which is hardly a new phenomenon in nonwhite communities) gained such national visibility was that they occurred during the administration of a black president. That a black man could attain the highest elected political office in the country and yet black men, women, and children continued to be killed with impunity in the streets by the police raised deeply unsettling questions about the strategy of pursuing black restitution through electoral politics, mirroring what had been the dominant form of black politics in the United States in the post–civil rights era. The predictable contradictions of attempts to achieve radical change through formal politics aimed primarily at the state have thus been thrown into stark relief by contemporary black protest movements. We can think of black political thought, informed by these activisms, as attempting to create the conceptual space to articulate more emancipatory and decolonializing forms of black activism in

order to begin imagining the process of designing alternatives to the colonial-racial constitutions of our postcolonial Western polities. Contrary to Iton’s assessment of black politics in the first decade of the twentyfirst century, today we seem to be witnessing the emergence of revitalized black protest movements that articulate powerful ripostes to overly pragmatic, incremental, and state-centric forms of black politics with aspiring to other forms of black political reconstruction. Black Rage / Black Death How should black political thought understand and engage with the rage and anger in black protests against repeated racial atrocities? We recall an early 1960s interview with James Baldwin where he famously remarked, citing the existential, ethical, and political dilemmas facing black populations in the United States, that “to be a Negro in this country and to be relatively conscious, is to be in a rage almost all the time” (Baldwin et al. 1961: 205). Arguably, today black rage has reached unprecedented public and global visibility, mediated by quotidian police killings of black people, new forms of relentless black activism, and ever-vigilant and vocal black social media. In the United States, the catalyst for the current focus on the politics of black death occurred in 2013 following the killing of the black teenager Trayvon Martin and the acquittal of his civilian killer, George Zimmerman. That was the occasion when the #BlackLivesMatter movement was inaugurated by the activism of three black queer women, Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi. Then in August 2014 black rage erupted in relation to the shooting of an unarmed black teenager, Michael Brown, by a white police officer, in Ferguson, Missouri. The subsequent violent response by law enforcement to protests in Ferguson and black social media responses to that event created the spectacle and signifier #Ferguson, which inaugurated a critique of three overlapping racial facts. First, it critiqued the killings of young black people by the police and the racial pathologization of black victims by the police and corporate mass media. Second, it signified the racial terrorism and militarization of the police and the criminalization of black protest. Third, it signified (contrary to claims that the United States had become a color-blind society in the wake of the 1960s and particularly after the election of Barack Obama in 2008) the continued hegemony of white supremacy, which was heightened by the deference to unquestioned police authority expected of citizens and the media post-9/11. Since then, the political visibility and social media dissemination of killings of black people by the police have become virtually quotidian, while the diverse and decentered #BlackLivesMatter movement is viewed as a new civil rights movement for the twenty-first century. It is clear that Black Lives Matter has borrowed tactics from earlier protest movements (e.g., black power, black feminism), particularly the emphasis on publicly disruptive demonstrations and expositional uses of popular culture. It has also pioneered new strategies, such as the use of social media to organize, heighten immediacy, and widen the scope of the public that acts as witness to the disposability of black lives. The Baltimore protests of April 2015, following the police-induced death of Freddie Gray, renewed the sense of crisis in black communities, signifying an evolving and uncertain political conjuncture of repeated acts of police violence against black bodies followed by innovative forms of organized black exposure of such violence that challenge the notion of democratic politics as usual. There is thus a prevailing undecidability in black political forms that needs to be understood if black rage is to lead to more than a tragically predictable impasse: black death, followed by protest, calls to await the work of the legal system, indictment or nonindictment, nonconviction, and repeat, in an endless loop. Black political thought has to grapple with the contemporary crisis of visible and unapologetic white supremacist rule, the pathologization of black rage, and the normalization of spectacles of black pain and suffering. However, tracing the recent evolution of black protest in the United States should not be taken as license to privilege the United States in our analyses of black politics or in our conceptualization of black political thought. Too often attempts to think about black politics transnationally in the current conjuncture are framed in terms of how the concern with the disposability of black life articulated by the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States has resonated and echoed elsewhere (see, e.g., Hooker 2017). A more conceptually productive approach is to analyze the Black Lives Matter movement as part of a global moment of resurgent black protest, as exemplified in the various South African student movements or in the decades-long movements protesting police violence and brutality against black communities in Brazil led by black women, and in the UK by black defense groups (see Perry 2013; Smith 2016; Bangura 2016). Equally instructive is the question of how black protest strategies become deterritorialized and reterritorialized as they “travel” from place to place. How does the meaning of the signifier #Ferguson shift, for example, when it becomes part of the French black protest organization called Ferguson in Paris? Founded in September 2014 following the murder of Brown by US police, Ferguson in Paris was created by French activists fighting against “Negrophobia” and all forms of racism and discrimination. Its goal is “to demonstrate that in France, as in the U.S. and around the world, the same people are oppressed by neo-colonial capitalism, and although the contexts are different in different countries, the oppressive patterns remain the same” (Ferguson in Paris 2016; our translation). Ferguson in Paris thus evokes familiar images: Brown’s slain body lying in the street, protesters being teargassed and confronted by heavily armed police, and the violent repression of black protest. At the same time, Ferguson in Paris dislocates these familiar patterns of racialized oppression by transposing them to the Parisian banlieues (suburbs), which have been the site of violent protests against French racism for decades. Ferguson in Paris is thus not a declaration of the sameness of black suburban spaces; it is rather an attempt to shake the certainty of the French about their society’s lack of racism by the jarring juxtaposition of a US example of contemporary racial terror and state depredation of black communities with the iconic (and implicitly nonblack) space “Paris.” The history of black mobilization in the French banlieues predates the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, but it raises analogous questions about the implications of the spatial politics of race for the preservation of black life. We know that black movements in the United States have dealt with questions of gentrification and disinvestment in urban black communities for decades. The existence of Ferguson in Paris, urban black movements in Brazil fighting displacement and state violence, and black defense organizations in the UK protesting black deaths in police custody makes clear that the links between the construction of urban space, the criminalization of blackness, and the displacement of black bodies and communities are in no way limited to the United States. The displays of black rage in South Africa, Latin America, and Europe are thus not movements sparked in response to Black Lives Matter, nor are they simply echoing US concerns. Each site of activism is implicated in the elaboration of globalized black protest. Back to Black Life The individuality and sociality of black people’s lives have long been politicized by the violent and governing intrusions of race as a regime of social order. Contributors to this issue of South Atlantic Quarterly are thus grappling with and reflecting on the meaning of black life in black politics in the history of the present. We are concerned with how black political thought in its various incarnations can navigate pathways beyond the impasse of this global racial conjuncture. Echoing earlier black thinkers’ refusal to conceptualize the problem of racism as the “Negro problem,” we also resist the liberal-democratic problematization of nonformalized black politics as social pathology. We aim to point the way forward for how to not conceptualize black politics as a problem. We underline the failures and inhospitality of liberal democratic theory in accepting black anger as a coherent response to racial terror and police violence and suggest that the critique of disruptive forms of black protest as counterproductive (because they preclude white empathy) should be turned on its head by focusing instead on how other forces, such as white grievance, are shaping contemporary forms of state racial violence and subordinating black politics.

# 2AC

### 2AC AT: Reed

#### Validating individual rejection of conformity is a means of empowerment that can transform the lives of individuals and society

Cohen 4 Cathy J. Cohen is the David and Mary Winton Green Professor of Political Science and the College at the University of Chicago DEVIANCE AS RESISTANCE: A New Research Agenda for the Study of Black Politics Cohen, Cathy J Author. Du Bois Review; Cambridge Vol. 1, Iss. 1, (Mar 2004): 27-45.

Sadly, while the moral prescriptions of this normative structure pervade nearly every aspect of our lives and have been used consistently to marginalize African Americans further, little attention has been paid, at least in the social sciences, to how the normalizing influences of the dominant society have been challenged, or at least countered, often by those most visible as its targets. Reflecting Michel Foucault's idea of simultaneous repressive and generative power, individuals with little power in society engage in counter normative behaviors, having babies before they are married, structuring their relationships differently from the traditional nuclear family, or rejecting heterosexuality completely. These so-called deviants have chosen and acted differently, situating their lives in direct contrast to dominant normalized understandings of family, desire, and sex. It is these instances of deviant practice, resulting from the limited agency of those most marginal in Black communities that are the heart of this work. Scholars, especially those interested in the evolving nature of Black politics, must take seriously the possibility that in the space created by deviant discourse and practice, especially in Black communities, a new radical politics of deviance could emerge. It might take the shape of a radical politics of the personal, embedded in more recognized Black counter publics, where the most marginal individuals in Black communities, with an eye on the state and other regulatory systems, act with the limited agency available to them to secure small levels of autonomy in their lives. Ironically, through these attempts to find autonomy, these individuals, with relatively little access to dominant power, not only counter or challenge the presiding normative order with regard to family, sex, and desire, but also create new or counter normative frameworks by which to judge behavior. And while these choices are not necessarily made with explicitly political motives in mind, they do demonstrate that people will challenge established norms and rules and face negative consequences in pursuit of goals important to them, often basic human goals such as pleasure, desire, recognition, and respect. These visible choices and acts of defiance challenge researchers to identify how we might leverage the process people use to choose deviance to choose political resistance as well. It just might be that after devoting so much of our energy to the unfulfilled promise of access through respectability, a politics of deviance, with a focus on the transformative potential found in deviant practice, might be a more viable strategy for radically improving the lives and possibilities of those most vulnerable in Black communities. Finally, it is important to remember, as theorists of stigma and deviance have written, that understandings of what is respectable and stigmatized or normal and deviant are constructed and relational. Erving Goffman (1963) in his book Stigma writes, "Society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories. ... We lean on these anticipations that we have, transforming them into normative expectations, into righteously presented demands" (p. 2). Howard Becker (1973) in his study of the sociology of deviance continues along this line of reasoning and suggests that scholars be attuned to the distinction between rule-breaking behavior and the labeling of such behavior as deviant. He writes, "... deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender.' The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label" (p. 9). In the rest of this article I will explore the feasibility of a politics of deviance in Black communities. I begin this investigation with a brief review of the major frameworks for studying Black politics. I then recount the ways deviance has been examined in some of the canonical texts in African American Studies. Finally, I detail how we might build an analytic model detailing the relationship between deviance, defiance, and resistance. TWENTIETH-CENTURY OBSESSIONS: A BLACK POLITICS OF RESPECTABILITY, ELITES, AND PUBLIC OPINION A review of much of the recent scholarship exploring the politics of African Americans reveals at least three dominant analytic frameworks of study: mobilization, respectability, and public opinion. While each of these approaches to investigating Black politics allows for the inclusion of those most vulnerable and seemingly "deviant" in Black communities, absent in each approach is a serious examination of the potential for politics in the everyday decisions and actions of these individuals and groups. For example, possibly the most widely read form of analysis of Black politics has been scholarship documenting and analyzing the organized efforts, formal and informal movements, and less structured uprisings originating in Black communities, meant to alter hierarchies of power and resources based at least partially in racial distinctions (Horne 1995; Kelley 2002; Marable 1991; Morris 1984). Work ranging from an analysis of Black revolts under slavery to the nationalist efforts of leaders like Marcus Garvey to the election of Black politicians to the mass mobilization defining the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements are all part of this tradition. However, more often than not, such scholarly analyses have sought to highlight those structured, coordinated, and seemingly purposeful acts assumed to comprise meaningful political struggle. Furthermore, these studies have at times been so consumed with the actions of leaders, usually male leaders, and well-established political organizations that they have ignored the everyday contests over space, dress, and autonomy that may pervade the lives of average Black people. Most of this literature, even when presumably exploring the work of "everyday" people, looks to those clearly defined political spaces like churches, civil rights organizations, and unions to find politics and political work, negating social spaces where most politics is lived (Harris-Lacewell 2004; Kelley 1994; Scott 1990). Of course, a politics of mobilization has not been the only lens through which African American politics has been explored and described. A second dominant framework used to understand Black politics has been that of respectability. In this approach respectability is used to categorize a process of policing, sanitizing, and hiding the nonconformist and some would argue deviant behavior of certain members of African Americans communities (Carby 1987, Gaines 1996, Higginbotham 1993). In this literature respectability is understood as a strategy deployed primarily by the Black middle class but also by other individuals across the Black class strata to demonstrate their adherence to and upholding of the dominant norms of society. It is hoped and expected that such conformity will confer full citizenship status, bringing with it greater access, opportunities, and mobility. And while some recent scholarship has cast a critical eye on the exclusionary processes associated with a political strategy of respectability, it is important that we not trivialize or demean this vehicle to political advancement since for many African Americans it was not only a mechanism to leverage dominant power but also a means to demonstrate the basic humanity and equality of Black Americans (Carby 1987, Gaines 1996, Higginbotham 1993, McBride 1998). It is, however, important to underscore, as critics of respectability remind us, the relative positioning necessary to prove that one is respectable and acceptable compared to other less fortunate "souls" who compromise the excluded. Historian Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham (1993), in her examination of Black women's involvement and leadership in the Baptist church in the early twentieth century, describes the use of a politics of respectability to counter the dominant racist constructions of Blackness and gender. She writes, "While adherence to respectability enabled Black women to counter racist images and structures, their discursive contestation was not directed solely at White Americans; the black Baptist women condemned what they perceived to be negative practices and attitudes among their own people. Their assimilationist leanings led to their insistence upon Blacks' conformity to the dominant society's norms of manners and morals. Thus the discourse of respectability disclosed class and status differentiation" (p. 187). Thus, another approach to studying the politics of African Americans, an approach first deployed by scholars in the humanities, has been an interrogation of the extra-institutional, some might say, social and cultural actions of Black Americans. Through the framework of respectability the researcher is primarily concerned with the actions of those who would regulate, most often middle-class Black Americans and working-class Blacks with middle-class aspirations. Again, lost in this analysis are the agency and actions of those under surveillance, those being policed, those engaged in disrespectable behavior. Missing from this understanding of Black politics is what Robin Kelley calls "a politics from below" (1994, p. 5). The third and final approach to the study of Black politics I will mention briefly is the overwhelming focus on the public opinion of Black Americans found in the social sciences today, especially in the field of political science. Increasingly, as researchers in the social sciences became committed to the use of large N datasets to map out the political attitudes and behaviors of ordinary people, so too did scholars in the field of Black politics demonstrate increasing expertise in the use of statistical analysis in conjunction with newly developed datasets such as the National Black Election Study and the National Black Politics Study to explore the declared politics of Black respondents. The work of scholars such as Michael Dawson (2003, 1994), Larry Bobo (2000), Katherine Tate (1998), and many others has provided new insights into the ideological and behavioral dimensions of African American politics in the late twentieth century. Unfortunately, while this literature often includes close analysis of differences in political attitudes and behavior based on class and in some cases sex and gender, the in-depth exploration of how such differences might be molded into a new politics for the twenty-first century has largely been ignored. This scholarship tends to excel in identifying and explaining differences found among African Americans and between African Americans and other members of racial and ethnic groups, most often White Americans. Left for a later day has been any sustained discussion of how the differences identified manifest themselves in the everyday lives and politics of Black people. Similarly, scholars of this orientation seem to shy away from more theoretical and normative discussions of what should be done to change the patterns of inequality, alienation, and anger evident in their data. Thus, while all three of these approaches to analyzing politics and political work in Black communities have generated important insights, illuminating the multiple forms of resistance and ideas about politics found among Black Americans, there exists an inherent bias in each framework toward the recognition and study of a politics that is declared and traditionally organized. I am not suggesting that the political activity of poor, working-class, and marginal Black people has not made its way into our published accounts of Black politics. Instead, I contend that the politics of those most marginal in Black communities are usually discussed when they conform to traditional understandings of what constitutes legitimate politics, ranging from engagement with formal political institutions to the traditional, extra-systemic politics of riots, boycotts, and protests, to the adherence to dominant norms and expectations regarding behavior. Again, missing is an examination of the possibility of oppositional politics rooted outside of traditional or formal political institutions and, instead, in the daily lived experiences of those most marginal in Black communities. Given these absences, those of us concerned with the lives and politics of Black people might do well to recalibrate our lens of examination toward those deemed "deviant" in Black communities, for here lies not only understudied populations but more importantly groups engaging in behaviors that I believe hold the potential for new understandings of how Black politics might once again become radically transformative for Black communities and the country at large. By transformative I am not arguing merely for better policies or a slight shift in the distribution of wealth and power, important as these advances are. Instead, I am suggesting that through a focus on "deviant" practice we are witness to the power of those at the bottom, whose everyday life decisions challenge, or at least counter, the basic normative assumptions of a society intent on protecting structural and social inequalities under the guise of some normal and natural order to life. However, not only do these individuals daily act in opposition to dominant norms, but they also contradict members of Black communities who are committed to mirroring perceived respectable behaviors and hierarchal structures. I am urging scholars to take a critical and respectful look at such behavior, instead of the instinctive reaction of rushing to pathologize such acts. With careful investigation we might begin to understand why the same people who daily "reject" formal and informal incentives for conformity, choosing instead alternative and oppositional live-styles, are most often not engaged in the kind of mass mobilization that organizers and academics contend would significantly improve their lived condition. It is time for a new generation of scholars to put forth a new analytic framework for the study of Black politics, that of deviance. This, of course, means hearing from and listening to those who many would silence and make invisible in Black communities, individuals like single Black mothers, including those on welfare and/or teen-agers; gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer members of Black communities; Black men on the "down-low" having at times risky sex with both men and women; and young Black men and women who are currently or have been incarcerated and who seem to engage uncritically in unlawful behavior with knowledge of the growing consequences of such behavior. Only by listening to their voices, trying to understand their motivations, and accurately centering their stories with all of its complexities in our work can we begin to understand and map the connection between deviant practice, defiant behavior, and political resistance.

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### 2AC FW Top Level

#### The efforts to silence, control or limit the content of black women is an act of pathologizing that directly harms the health of individuals

Perlow 18 Dr. Olivia Perlow is a Professor of Sociology,AAAS and Women’s and Gende Studies at Northeastern Illinois University, Black Women's Liberatory Pedagogies: Resistance, Transformation, and Healing Within and Beyond the Academy edited by Olivia N. Perlow, Durene I. Wheeler, Sharon L. Bethea, BarBara M. Scott

Dehumanizing and pathologizing Black women through hegemonic images in order to control us carries over into the present day (see, c.g., Davis, 2006; Richie, 2012; Roberts, 2003). The "angry black woman" is one of the most prevalent contemporary stereotypes about Black women that functions to stifle our voices and impede dissent by portraying us as aggressive, irrational, ill-tempered, and hostile, regardless of the circumstances or provocation (Morgan 8: Bennett, 2006). This stereotype is so common that even Black women in extremely prestigious positions such as Michelle Obama have been undermined by accusations of embodying this stereotype (Harris-Perry, 2011; Johnson, 2012; Madison, 2009). According to Madison (2009), stereotyping Michelle Obama as an "angry black woman" during the 2008 presidential campaign "was both easier and more compatible with normalized notions of gender and blackness than to engage the more complicated genealogy of black rage in the USA" (p. 323). In a similar vein, in tracing the evolution of her resistance work, author/ blogger Mia McKenzie (a.k.a. Black Girl Dangerous) calls attention to the silencing of Black women in the following statement: I thought about all the white women who had labeled me angry or aggressive just because I refused to be silent or invisible...I decided that instead of being silent. . .I would he louder. That instead of becoming invisible, I would become manifest. That instead of being defeated, I would triumph...over everyone who ever looked at a black woman and saw someone who could be silenced, someone whose story didn't matter, whose voice didn't count...l decided that, instead of dying, I would live. And that I would be dangerous. Really dangerous. The kind of dangerous that would make a difference in the world. (2014, pp. 3-4) Black women's anger and even rage can produce moments of profound clarity. Furthermore, in calling out the utter hypocrisy of white supremacist (il)logic, both Harris' and McKenzie's refusal to self-censor and kow tow to white supremacist social control is tactically transformative and liberatory. bell hooks (1989) states that for Black women: ...true speaking is not solely an expression of creative power; it is an act of resistance, a political gesture that challenges politics of domination that would render us nameless and voiceless. As such, it is a courageous act-as such, it represents a threat. To those who wield oppressive power, that which is threatening must necessarily be wiped out, annihilated, silenced. (p. 8) Because Black women are one of the most vulnerable populations in the academy (Nzinga-Johnson, 2013), true speaking is an act that Few of us are in a position to and / or are brave enough to engage in nowadays. Thus when Black women academics do choose to Blackspmle angry (neck- rolling) truth to power, to push back against the politics of respectability and against white middle-class civility and fragility, it is more than an act of political will, it is an act of apostasy! That is what those that seek to control Black women fear the m0st-when we are angry, woke, and unafraid. This is the way it has been historically and it is thus the rebellious voices of Black foremothers that motivate my forward movement. Writer Lorene Cary captures my sentiments about the influence of Black women's voices on her own writing: "They burst into my silence, and in my head, they shouted and chattered and whispered and sang together. I am writing...to become part of that unruly conversation, and to bring my experience back to the community of minds that made it possible" (Johnson 8: Loch, 1995, p. 17). The remainder of this chapter is my attempt to join "that unruly conversation" as I explore my anger as an ongoing personal, intel- lectual, political, and pedagogical project as a Black woman professor tra- versing hostile terrain while seeking to destabilize a white supremacist patriarchal academy and society. The "angry Black woman" stereotype dehumanizes Black women by reducing all of our individuality and complexity to a single emotion: anger. It is an erasure of the multiplicity of our identities, our histories, our cul- tures, our experiences, and it ultimately "shrinks us to shells of ourselves" (Mock, 2014, p. 249). Furthermore, this stereotype pathologizes Black women whose behaviors do not conform to white middleclass standards and this is exacerbated by racist, ethnocentric, and xenophobic (mis)inter- pretations of Black women's cultural expressions (Ashely, 2014; Baraka, 1997; Lanehart, 2002). This emotional reductionism coupled with the widespread expectation that Black women be strong/superwomen-or like Nanny in Their Eyes Were Watching God says, "de mule uh de world" (Hurston, 1990)-masks and therefore neglects our very real human pain and vulnerabilities (Beaubeouf-Latontant, 2009; Harris, 2015; Wallace, 1980). Furthermore, as Ashely (2014) notes, there is a plethora of research demonstrating Black women's cognizance of the "angry Black woman" stereotype and of the negative consequences for being seen as such (see, e.g., Durr and VVingfield, 2011; Gon7.ale7.-Prendes & Thomas, 201 1; Lewis 8: Neville, 2015; VValley-Iean, 2009). Consequently, this produces a politics of silence (Higginbotham, 1994) in which many Black women feel that they must suppress their anger for fear of confirming this stereotype (Wingfield, 2007, 2010). Thus the ability of Black women to freely express anger is constrained and those who do so are often subjected to a great deal of scrutiny (Fritsch, 2015; Harris, 2015; VVingfie|d, 2010). However, anger is a universal emotion, a survival mechanism alerting us to harm (Lerner, 1997), so Black women suppressing their anger can lead to negative health outcomes (Ashely, 2014; West, 1995).

### 2AC FW AT: Fairness

#### Their effort to make the game “fair” for the sake of education and preserving the tradition of the institution of debate is a practice that replicates racism and white privilege—this also means structural fairness outweighs

Wilderson 2008

Frank B., Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid South End Press, pg. 406-411

Just two years ago, in December of 1999, I'd written a letter and stuffed it, late one night, in the faculty mailboxes. It began with what must have appeared to the faculty's confused eyes as a red herring. It spoke not about my excruciating encounters with them, but began, instead, out of left field by discussing the plight of two students whose troubles with the College had been the topic of recent debate. Reading of Sonia Rodriguez's and Selma Thornton's troubles with the Student Senate and its White liberal adviser Tim Harold reawakened my disdain for Cabrillo as an institution and for the English Division as one of its flagship entities. I then went on to explain how Selma and Sonia had resigned their posts in the Student Senate in protest over Harold's decision not to allow thirty students of color to have funds to travel to a conference on race at Hartnell College. Instead, Harold spent the money on T-shirts. He had also put the sign-up sheet for the conference not in the Student Center, but in some obscure location where it would never be found thus sabotaging the excursion further. This seemed like a trivial enough matter, but it compounded the hurt and sense of isolation and rebuke which so many Black and Latino students felt at Cabrillo but could not name. I felt a piqued kinship with their unspeakable pain and used the rare moment of it having turned into a tangible event as a way into what I wanted to say to the faculty and administration...and to Alice. In defense of his actions, and as a way of indicating the absurdity of Selma and Sonia's objections, Harold issued a public statement in which he did not comment (or at least the newspaper did not report his comments) on his funding priorities; rather, he simply said "The sign-up sheet was posted for a week, the same way we treat any workshop." To this, I wrote: Whereas Selma Thornton attempts an institutional analysis of the Student Senate by way of a critique of Tim Harold and his practices, Harold responds with a ready made institutional defense and, later in the article, a defense of his integrity (a personalized response to an institutional analysis). He brings the scale of abstraction back down to the level most comfortable for White people: the individual and the uncontextualized realm of fair play. It's the White person's safety zone. I'm a good person, I'm a fair person, I treat everyone equally, the rules apply to everyone. Thornton and Rodriguez's comments don't indict Harold for being a "good" person, they indict him for being White: a way of being in the world which legitimates institutional practices (practices which Thornton and Rodriguez object to) accepts, and promotes, them as timeless—without origin, consequence, interest, or allegiance—natural and inevitable. "The sign-up sheet was posted for a week, the same way we treat any workshop." The whole idea that we treat everyone equally is only slightly more odious than the discussion or how we can treat everyone equally; because the problem is neither the practice nor the debates surrounding it, but the fact that White people can come together and wield enough institutional power to constitute a "We." "We" in the Student Senate, "We" in Aptos, "We" in Santa Cruz, "We" in the English department, "We" in the boardrooms. "We" are fair and balanced is as odious as "We" are in control—they are derivations of the same expression: "We" are the police. The claim of "balance and fair play" forecloses upon, not only the modest argument that the practices of the Cabrillo Student Senate are racist and illegitimate, but it also forecloses upon the more extended, comprehensive, and antagonistic argument that Cabrillo itself is racist and illegitimate. And what do we mean by Cabrillo? The White people who constitute its fantasies of pleasure and its discourse of legitimacy. The generous "We." So, let's bust "We" wide open and start at the end: White people are guilty until proven innocent. Fuck the compositional moves of substantiation and supporting evidence: I was at a conference in West Oakland last week where a thousand Black folks substantiated it a thousand different ways. You're free to go to West Oakland, find them, talk to them, get all the proof you need. You can drive three hours to the mountains, so you sure as hell can cut the time in half and drive to the inner city. Knock on any door. Anyone who knows 20 to 30 Black folks, intimately—and if you don't know 12 then you're not living in America, you're living in White America—knows the statement to be true. White people are guilty until proven innocent. Whites are guilty of being friends with each other, of standing up for their rights, of pledging allegiance to the flag, of reproducing concepts like fairness, meritocracy, balance, standards, norms, harmony between the races. Most of all. Whites are guilty of wanting stability and reform. White people, like Mr. Harold and those in the English Division, are guilty of asking themselves the question. How can we maintain the maximum amount of order (liberals at Cabrillo use euphemisms like peace, harmony, stability), with the minimum amount of change, while presenting ourselves—if but only to ourselves—as having the best of all possible intentions. Good people. Good intentions. White people are the only species, human or otherwise, capable of transforming the dross of good intentions into the gold of grand intentions, and naming it "change." ...These passive revolutions, fire and brimstone conflicts over which institutional reform is better than the other one, provide a smoke screen—a diversionary play of interlocutions—that keep real and necessary antagonisms at bay. White people are thus able to go home each night, perhaps a little wounded, but feeling better for having made Cabrillo a better place...for everyone... Before such hubris at high places makes us all a little too giddy, let me offer a cautionary note: it's scientifically impossible to manufacture shinola out of shit. But White liberals keep on trying and end up spending a lifetime not knowing shit from shinola. Because White people love their jobs, they love their institutions, they love their country, most of all they love each other. And every Black or Brown body that doesn't love the things you love is a threat to your love for each other. A threat to your fantasy space, your terrain of shared pleasures. Passive revolutions have a way of incorporating Black and Brown bodies to either term of the debate. What choice does one have? The third (possible, but always unspoken) term of the debate, White people are guilty of structuring debates which reproduce the institution and the institution reproduces America and America is always and everywhere a bad thing this term is never on the table, because the level of abstraction is too high for White liberals. They've got too much at stake: their friends, their family, their way of life. Let's keep it all at eye level, where whites can keep an eye on everything. So the Black body is incorporated. Because to be unincorporated is to say that what White liberals find valuable I have no use for. This, of course, is anti-institutional and shows a lack of breeding, not to mention a lack of gratitude for all the noblesse oblige which has been extended to the person of color to begin with. "We will incorporate colored folks into our fold, whenever possible and at our own pace, provided they're team players, speak highly of us, pretend to care what we're thinking, are highly qualified, blah, blah, blah...but, and this is key, we won't entertain the rancor which shits on our fantasy space. We've killed too many Indians, worked too many Chinese and Chicano fingers to the bone, set in motion the incarcerated genocide of too many Black folks, and we've spent too much time at the beach, or in our gardens, or hiking in the woods, or patting each other on the literary back, or teaching Shakespeare and the Greeks, or drinking together to honor our dead at retirement parties ("Hell, Jerry White let's throw a party for Joe White and Jane White who gave Cabrillo the best White years of their silly White lives, that we might all continue to do the same White thing." "Sounds good to me, Jack White. Say, you're a genius! Did you think of this party idea all on your own?" "No, Jerry White, we've been doing it for years, makes us feel important. Without these parties we might actually be confronted by our political impotence, our collective spinelessness, our insatiable appetite for gossip and administrative minutia, our fear of a Black Nation, our lack of will." "Whew! Jack White, we sound pathetic. We'd better throw that party pronto!" "White you are, Jerry." "Jack White, you old fart, you, you're still a genius, heh, heh, heh.") too much time White-bonding in an effort to forget how hard we killed and to forget how many bones we walk across each day just to get from our bedrooms to Cabrillo...too, too much for one of you coloreds to come in here and be so ungrateful as to tell us the very terms of our precious debates are specious." But specious they are, as evidenced by recent uproar in the Adjunct vs. Minority Hire debates, or whether or not English 100 students should be "normed." The very terms of the debates suture discussions around White entitlement, when White entitlement is an odious idea. Whites are entitled to betray other Whites, nothing else... Beyond that you're not entitled to anything. So how could you possibly be entitled to a job? How could you possibly be entitled to decide who should pass and who should fail? How could you possibly be entitled to determining where the sign-up sheet for Diversity Day buses will or will not be placed, and how funds should be allocated? Okay...so some of you want to hire a "minority" as long as s/he's "well mannered and won't stab us in the back after s/he's in our sacred house;" and some of you want to hire an adjunct (Jill or Jeffery White) because, "What the hell—they've been around as long as Jack, Joe, Jerry, and Jane White, and shucks fair is fair, especially if you're entitled." And entitlement is a synonym for Whiteness. But there's only one job, because for years you've complained about the gate, while breathing collective (meaning White) sighs of relief that it was there to protect you from the hordes. (Somewhere down the street in Watsonville an immigrant is deciding whether to give his daughter or his wife up for the boss to fuck that he might have a job picking your fruit. Somewhere up the road in Oakland a teen is going to San Quentin for writing graffiti on a wall. And you're in here trying to be "fair" to each other, while promoting diversity—whatever that means. By the time you've arrived at a compromise over norming or faculty hires—your efforts to "enlighten" whoever doesn't die in the fields or fall from the earth into prison—the sista has been raped and the brotha busted. But then you've had a difficult day as well.) So, do what you always do. Hire the most qualified candidate. Here are some questions and guidelines to speed the search committee on its way and make everyone feel entitled.

### 2AC FW AT: TVA

#### Any potential TVA pathologizes—It says you can protest but only in the way we want you to—That is exactly how Kaeperick was pathologized

Pavlovitz 16 JOHN PAVLOVITZ Pastor and writer for Huffington Post, How People of Color Can Protest “The Right Way” for White America SEPTEMBER 3, 2016 /. <https://johnpavlovitz.com/2016/09/03/the-two-ways-colin-kaepernick-could-have-protested-properly/>

For almost two years I’ve listened to the same argument from folks, regarding Colin Kaepernick and other NFL athletes sitting during the National Anthem, as a way of bringing racial injustices to the public consciousness. “Well, I’m all for protesting—I just don’t think they’re doing it the right way.” “It’s not that I’m against speaking out. I’m fine with that. I just don’t like the way they did it.” “There’s a better way to do things like this.” So, a nonviolent gesture, when not on the field of play, to garner the attention of millions of people, and then following that up with a fairly clear verbal explanation of the whys of his protest and a million dollar donation to the work of reconciliation—isn’t the right way? These people don’t mean that. They’re lying, whether they know it or not. They’re not all for protesting, at least not for someone who looks like Kaepernick looks. This is the arrogant heart of privilege: being the beneficiaries of systematic injustice, and then wanting to make the rules for the marginalized in how they should speak into that injustice. To these people who claim to offended, there are only two ways that Colin Kaepernick or any other person of color for that matter, can protest the “right way”: shut up or be white. This is the very limited menu we have for him and the black community when desiring change or equality or respect: wait for us to give it to you. That’s not how America is supposed to work. Black voices matter. And that’s the saddest takeaway from all this for me: the way white people so effortlessly illustrated exactly what Kaepernick was protesting. He was trying to give a voice to people who don’t have one in the conversation, and he was badgered relentlessly by white people who tried to tone-police him into silence. The the more white Americans beat their breasts and tore their garments and broadcast their outrage at a civil, nonviolent expression of resistance by a man of color, the more they reminded us just why the conversation on race in America is so divisive and painful: because when the house is stacked for you, you don’t really care to have the odds changed. Colin Kaepernick is nether silent nor white, and the way he protested was the right way because it was his way. Now, we in white America need to respond the right way, to him and those who he speaks for: we need to sit down and listen.

## Cap K

### AT: Brown

#### Ressentiment is double speak for pathological

Mardorossian 2 - Associate Professor, University at Buffalo

Carine M., Toward a New Feminist Theory of Rape, Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 27(3)

What I take issue with is thus not Brown’s acute and cautionary account of feminist entanglements with the state but the Nietzschean framework in which she casts it. Brown argues that the politicized identity of feminist struggle is structured by a Nietzschean logic of ressentiment, that it is “an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self‐affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, rejection” (69). Feminist moral claims are a symptom of weakness, of feminists’ incapacity to action and thwarted “will to power” that leads to vengefulness and “toxic resentments.” Thus, Brown sees feminist rights‐based politics as turning powerlessness into “a dissimulated political discourse of recriminations and toxic resentments parading as radical critique” (xi). While her critique of rights discourse is well taken, her characterization of feminist scholarship and practice reproduces the tradition of inwardness through which women and feminists are typically discredited. Indeed, attributing a feminist practice to a logic of resentment applies a trait Nietzsche uses to define individual character to a political movement and thus personalizes and psychologizes the latter. While I agree that the effects of politicized identity might lock us into a politics of recrimination, to resort to the Nietzschean notion sets up ressentiment as the driving paradigm in feminist thought. It is not a critique of the negative effect of a well‐meaning but limited political strategy but a critique of the source of negativity from which feminist politics derive. Feminism is endowed with a “slave morality” that makes it react to pain emotionally by inflicting suffering in return. Brown’s account of resentment as reaction to hurt, or in Nietzsche’s own words “as a desire to deaden pain by means of affect,” is a forceful description of the effects of capitalism and the bureaucratic state on the individuated and “impotent” late modern liberal subject (68–69). As a characterization of feminist reformist strategies, however, it succeeds only in pathologizing and individualizing an oppositional political movement that is made to sound like it is more in need of therapy than of a renewed political emphasis. Ressentiment in Nietzschean terminology is too closely associated with instinctual and affective conditions for it not to invoke an internalized and pathological interiority that takes a life of its own above and beyond the injury it seeks to address. As a result, feminist politics is not seen in terms of the potentially antidemocratic effects of its prescriptions but in terms of its underlying motivation itself. Nietzsche’s (1967) account of the workings of ressentiment cited in States of Injury highlights the psychologizing tendencies I am pointing out here: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering—in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy. … This … constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects, … to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all. (Quoted in Brown 1995, 68)

### AT Brown/Bergum

#### Group Brown and Bergum. Double bind either:

#### A) Epistemic disobediance disrupts wounded attachment and solves narcissism/ressentiment.

Muñoz 2014 – José Esteban Muñoz was a professor in Performance Studies at New York University from 1994 until his death in 2013 (“Wise Latinas,” Criticism Spring 2014, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 249–265)

Like Berlant, I contend that work that starts out in the key of the particular—let’s say art and media that signal the abuses that Latinas and Latina femininity endure within North American culture and politics— can become more generalized without ever losing its resonant specificity. This ability to resonate is key, and in this way we can once again understand the difference that affect makes. The structural booby traps within the social that Brown warns us against are fueled by a belief in a pervading feeling of Nietzschean ressentiment dominating not only the actions, strategies, and tactics of social actors who do not automatically displace the particular or the singular for the general or universal. What Brown’s theory of the impasse describes as wounded attachment depends on a belief in a stable and rigid affective field. But certain affective responses, especially unanticipatable ones, performed through comportment and behaviors that I have described as the wise Latina’s repertoire of brown otherwiseness, inherently suggest another response to social wounding than the repetitive and unthinking attachment that Brown diagnoses as the problem plaguing the politics of many people, many of them brown, who reject an aspirational universalism. The example of Bustamante’s dress, one associated with her Mexican heritage, being repeatedly shot again by the gun enthusiast may visually cohere to some aspects of Brown’s theory of wounded attachment but differs in some crucial ways. Bustamante’s performance aesthetics play with the idea of being a perpetually wounded subject trapped in the impasse of what amounts to a stalled singularity. But the artist’s work symbolically, through her unpredictable response to this wounding, breaks off from Brown’s idea of wounded attachment. Bustamante goads the shooter to continue firing. After the dress has been shot up, she inspects the bullet holes and gleefully reports that the Kevlar has caught the bullets and that she would have probably survived if she had been in the dress. She engages the visibly confused marksman, who reluctantly agrees that she probably would have survived. Bustamante, like Montez and Sotomayor, the other wise Latinas I have discussed, refused to take responsibility for the experience of those who would judge her. Instead, her work represents the refusal of the compulsory mimetic performance that is often thrust upon the minoritarian subject. Otherwiseness is a performance of affective noncompliance that is intrinsically linked to a sense of brownness that Jean-Luc Nancy would describe as a simultaneous being singular and plural.25 Our sense of singularity is knowable only in relation to the sense that is produced in relation to the plurality of singularities that constitute the world. Feeling brown is an aspect of a larger sense of brown that is simultaneously singular and plural. It is through feeling that we know, or more nearly sense, the brownness of the world and one another.

#### Or B) If their diagnosis of neurosis is true then the aff is necessary to negotiate an apriori condition of disidentification – that’s key to map the narcissistic violence of racial capitalism. Failure to include the aff alongside the alt is violent clinical practice. A neg ballot tells black people to get over it because they’re being too psychosomatic.

Maitra 2018 – Ani Maitra is an assistant professor of global film and media at Colgate University (“Aberrant Narcissisms in Dolto, Lacan, and Fanon: Notes on a Wounded Imaginary,” differences : A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 28:3 pp. 124-128) KR

Coda: “Meaning” in the (Cracked) Maternal Mirror

By examining the role that symbolic mediation plays in Fanon’s, Dolto’s, and Lacan’s accounts of wounded imaginary narcissism, this essay has offered an intermedial account of the subject under racialized capital, a subject who is somewhere between language, image, and the body, insofar none of these mediums can be privileged over the others. Writing in 1953, Lacan describes the deleterious materiality of the linguistic signifier in the body image in the following way: “[L]anguage is not immaterial. It is a subtle body, but body it is. Words are caught up in all the body images that captivate the subject [. . .]. Furthermore, words themselves can suffer symbolic lesions and accomplish imaginary acts whose victim is the subject” (“Function” 248; my emphasis). The linguistic signifier can create imaginary lesions, at once beguile and injure the subject of the unconscious. Through Fanon’s critique of language as an apparatus of racial capital, I have tried to show how these imaginary linguistic acts produce embodied identities as fragmented and flexible entities in the colony and postcolony. From within this paradigm, the material signifier does not lead us back to the locus of the Other by exposing the imaginary as “just” an illusory defense but instead produces symbolic lesions that sustain the imaginaries of (post)colonial language workers.

I have also suggested that, in both the clinical and cultural articulations of the mirror stage, this materiality of the signifier is also partly constituted through the embodied and affectively charged utterances of socially situated speaking agents—the mother, the au pair, the child on the train, the call center customer, and so on. In conclusion, I would also like to complicate this similarity through historical difference.

In this context, a certain gap emerges between the so-called typical encounter with one’s own image successfully mediated by language and the refigured reappearance of that mediated encounter in the (post)colonial context. We noted how, for Dolto, soothing maternal speech usually aids the child to manage the difference between the specular image and the unconscious image. And for Lacan, the person mediating the typical mirror encounter is important only insofar as he or she represents the symbolic Other that overwrites the imaginary. In contrast, Fanon presents us with two ordinary scenarios—one literary and the other personal/anecdotal—where maternal speech actively disciplines and splits the child’s selfimage. In a poem by Léon-G. Damas (from which Fanon quotes in Black Skin), it is the black Antillean mother who goads her son to avoid Creolisms and to speak “[t]he French from France / The Frenchman’s French / French French” (4). And again, later, Fanon reminisces with regard to his own mother: “I am a black man—but naturally I don’t know it, because I am one. When I am home my mother sings [to] me, in French, French love songs where there is never a mention of black people. Whenever I am naughty or when I make too much noise, I am told to ‘stop acting like a nigger’” (168). Here, we cannot ignore Fanon’s insinuation that it is the Antillean mother who is responsible for the wounded ego of her son. Several critics have noted Fanon’s problematic attitude toward women and simultaneously demonstrated that his gender and sexual politics need to be situated in the context of the erotics of racism itself, as evinced, for instance, in the “phobically charged stereotype of the violent, lawless, and oversexed Negro” (Fuss 31).27 I would, however, like to move past the emphasis on Fanon’s individual psyche and focus on the commonality between the literary representation and the anecdotal memory of the mother as an agent of the jouissance of the Other.

In both these examples, the Antillean mother emphatically disapproves of her child’s linguistic habits and/or social behavior with reference to a certain idealized notion of the French language and culture. The vocal command prohibiting speaking in Creole or “acting like a nigger” is, in one sense, a violent negation of the child’s self-image, a coercive reconfiguration of his habitus, and marks the beginning of the mimicry continued by the self-disciplining adult practicing the French r. Fanon’s examples, therefore, point toward an unavoidable disruption (or even impossibility) of linguistic security for the colonized continually bombarded with racially charged signifiers. The figure of the speaking mother, in these scenes, becomes a split mirror for the child, where the image of her corporeal blackness is at odds with the antiblack whiteness/Frenchness idealized by her speech.

Furthermore, these scenes of linguistic dis/identification also point to the limits of cultural criticism that adamantly defends the asymmetry, misfire, or constant slippage of meaning in the symbolic order. It is possible to argue that the expression “[S]top acting like a nigger,” heard/ seen in the maternal acoustic-specular mirror, does not “mean” anything substantive and is a response to the depersonalization introduced by the ideal-image of whiteness. But to disregard the imaginary significances of the phrase in the colony to privilege symbolic indeterminacy is to violently disavow its epidermalization, the traumatic transfer of a historical-racial schema from the mother to the child, and the profoundly ambivalent use of the signifiers nègre and Noir throughout Fanon’s text.

In these scenes with the mother’s voice disciplining the child, we also return to a specifically colonial manifestation of the Lacanian call—the imaginary import of the tones, gestures, the volume of the mother’s voice— that generate meanings as “lesions” in the imaginary. While discussing the experience of meaning in psychosis in Seminar III, Lacan reminds us that the psychotic subject experiences meaning in the course of a delusion without, paradoxically, fully knowing what that meaning is: “What is the subject ultimately saying, specially at a certain period of his delusion? That there is meaning. What meaning he doesn’t know, but it comes to the foreground, it asserts itself, and for him it’s perfectly understandable” (“Meaning” 21). Lacan goes on to note that in “passional psychosis, which seems so much closer to what is called normal,” the subject’s experience of meaning is governed by the fact that he “can’t come to terms with a certain loss or injury and because his entire life appears to be centred around compensation for the injury suffered and the claim it entails” (22). In the same lecture, Lacan identifies two poles along which meaning is experienced in psychosis:

The delusional intuition is a full phenomenon that has an overflowing, inundating character for the subject. It reveals a new perspective to him, one whose stamp of originality, whose characteristic savor, he emphasizes [. . .]. There, the word—with its full emphasis, as when one says the word for, the solution to, an enigma—is the soul of the situation. At the opposite pole there is the form that meaning takes when it no longer refers to anything at all. This is a formula that is repeated, reiterated, drummed in with a stereotyped insistence. It’s what we might call, in contrast to the word, the refrain. These two forms, the fullest and the emptiest, bring the meaning to a halt, it’s like lead in the net [. . .] of the subject’s discourse—a structural characteristic in which, once we approach it clinically, we recognize the mark of delusion. (33)

Simultaneously insisting on the intersection and difference between clinical and cultural approaches to the experience of meaning, we can see how racially objectifying terms like nègre or Noir can be experienced from near-normal “passional” perspectives, as meaning that asserts itself without having a particular referent, as injuries inflicted on individual bodies and segregated populations. From within this cultural-critical context, the signifier nègre, I want to suggest, also produces meaning for the racialized subject along the two poles that Lacan identifies: at one end is the slur nègre as a reiterated, meaningless stereotype or empty refrain that the subject, nevertheless, experiences as a “meaningful” injury without a specific referent. At the other end is the notion of negritude—the word reclaimed in reaction or response to that injury, an attempt to find a solution to restore the humanity of the (black) being dehumanized through everyday speech. Fanon repeatedly cites lines from a poem by Aimé Césaire to underscore this necessary experience of the meaning of negritude, even though he is aware that blackness is not reducible to an essence:

My negritude is not a stone, its deafness hurled against the clamor of day My negritude is not an opaque spot of dead water over the dead eye of the earth [. . .] It reaches deep down into the red flesh of the soil It reaches deep into the blazing flesh of the sky [. . .] Eia! The drums jabber out the cosmic message. Only the black man is capable of conveying it, of deciphering its meaning and impact. (103)

It should be clear by now that, by seeing the black stereotype and (for some, a problematically masculinist) black identitarianism as the two poles of a “delusional” black experience, I am neither dismissing nor celebrating the politics of dis/identification but insisting on its realness for the imaginary subject of race. As Mikko Tuhkanen has pointed out, it is this unrelenting inseparability of the imaginary and the real that becomes the basis of revolutionary and unrepresentably real violence in Fanon.28 Additionally, I am suggesting that these marginalized structures of dis/identification be seen as integral to the production of difference by the imperial narcissism of capitalism. Fanon makes it amply clear in Black Skin that, for him, immersion in negritude is a provisional step toward liberating “the black man from himself” (xii). And his strategic oscillation in the text between a postidentitarian future and an identitarian present should remind us that the very attempt to find the meaning of blackness has its origins deep within the colonial-capitalist logic of equivalence built on the backs of racialized labor. My contention, then, is that the cultural-critical advocates of symbolic freedom first need to confront this structural heterogeneity in the social realm and examine why/how capitalism generates identitarianism as a real delusion, one that makes a nonimaginary experience of symbolic lack or failure an untenable solution. The black mother and her child in Fanon’s accounts are by no means “outside” symbolic speech.29 But as “particular configuration[s] of the split subject that psychoanalytic theory posits” (Spillers 65), they are in no position to attend to a nonhistorical symbolic lack by disregarding the historicity and the ongoing fragmentation of their egos. Their individual and collectively imaginary experiences of disenfranchisement will, therefore, be pivotal to any form of symbolic rupture or real change that they come to envisage.

### 2AC AT: Reed

#### The alternative and the Reed evidence actively pathologize Black protest, crushes movement solvency, and stifles successful movements rooted in the intersections of class, race, and gender

Jain 17 (Uday, PhD student at University of Chicago, MA (Hons) Political Science at the University of Edinburgh, “White Marxism: A Critique of Jacobin Magazine” 8/11/17 https://newsocialist.org.uk/white-marxism-critique/)

It is in this spirit I propose the following thesis. As long as the emergent Jacobin-centred public sphere refuses to seriously engage with what they have derisively termed “identity” politics, it will alienate the most vital sections of a twenty-first century Marxist coalition and repeat the mistakes made by white socialist movements in the Western core throughout the twentieth century. As I will discuss in the conclusion, both Corbynism in the UK, and the Jacobin-centred public sphere more broadly, have much to gain from a serious engagement with what the latter have derisively termed “identitarian Leftism”. Foregrounding the histories, victories, and struggles of indigenous, Black, queer, feminist, disabilities, and migrant movements and how they have successfully theorized and contested patriarchal, racial, capitalist, and imperialist hierarchies only deepens a socialist analysis and ensures that the failures of exclusionary, one-dimensional forms of organising are not repeated. I use the term Jacobin-centred public sphere advisedly. The magazine’s wide range of published work includes a range of positions on race, gender, and class that can’t easily be categorized as being simply for or against identity politics as such. Yet, a sense remains – one that is substantiated by the tone and the content of strong polemical interventions by Vivek Chibber, Walter Benn Michaels, Nivedita Majumdar, and Adolph Reed - that one story that Jacobin is always ready to tell is the story of the apparent betrayal of class politics by an American “Identitarian Left”. The Fable of the Non-identitarian and identitarian Left The story goes something like this. There was once a non-identitarian left, a Left in America that emphasized nothing but class, that picked only the right battles and won them. This Left had its heyday in the unionist movements from the 1920s to the 1940s and brought about many of the victories of FDR’s New Deal. It had all the strengths of a trade-unionist organization. It was working-class, firm, strong, and decisive. Then starting in the 1960s, with the cultural revolution and the emergence of a theoretically prolix post-modernism, a demonic identity politics emerged fully-formed – ready to be appropriated by the bourgeoisie and destroy this powerful class-first Left once and for all. These New Leftists got so obsessed with philosophical and literary speculation about cultural oppression that they lost track of the real issues. So keyed into ‘intersectionality’ were these identitarians that vigourous contestation against the boss fell by the wayside. In fact, Michaels suggests, this obsession with identity was a way for these ‘Leftists’ to mask their own complicity with the bourgeois ruling class in its legitimation of a diversified capitalism. These New Leftists retreated to the academy, conjuring up ever more intricate and complex critiques of capitalism without ever offering a clear picture of how to fight it. Chibber adds that the misfortune of “social theory classes” in the last twenty-five years has been to make Leftists too obsessed with “margins”, misunderstanding the centrality of the working-class as a revolutionary subject. And so these Jacobin contributors – often promoted and foregrounded in the Jacobin public sphere - registered their profound intellectual and political disagreement with the post-1960s academic and political Left. Intersectional thought, cultural politics, identity politics, all of these tendencies fragmented a united Left by focusing on the fragments and the margins. They created a Left too theory-minded to understand the bloody realities of capturing power. These elitist “identitarian” academics and activists, born of the 1960s cultural revolutions, are held responsible for misunderstanding the basics of a Marxist class war and running the “Left” into a cul-de-sac that they deserve to stay in if they keep insisting on their current modes of thought and action. The role of Jacobin or at least these rather polemical interventions in the Jacobin pages is to bring class back, to make the “Left” Left again, to make the “Left” great again; and get us going on the march to working-class victory. White Marxism? The elisions and confusions entailed in this anti-identitarian story go a long way in explaining why in many radical circles Jacobin is now seen, fairly or unfairly, as a white socialist magazine. A magazine intent on erasing all the historic gains made by feminists, Black, and indigenous radical movements in favour of a reductionist, white-centric politics that harks back to a supposed golden age of the 1940s [1]. First of all, words have meaning. When such senior academics and activists as Michaels, Reed, Chibber, and Majumdar go out of their way to single out “intersectionality”, frames of analysis that focuses on the “margins”, and questions of “identity” as responsible for the comprehensive abatement of class politics in the American left, they can’t but be aware that they are not so subtly pinning the responsibility for this failure on Black feminists. After all, Kimberlé Crenshaw’s famous article, on how Black women’s experiences of male violence are conditioned by specific intersections of racism and sexism in American society, an analysis then missed in antiracist and feminist debates, was titled “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color”. Intersectionality as a political and intellectual project was developed by Black women scholars and activists to address the simple fact that as Black women, they are materially exploited, excluded, and subject to violence, due to distinct hierarchical structures that are largely ignored by a white, patriarchal, and racial capitalist society. In fighting and naming this oppression, they necessarily had to complicate easy unities of a given working-class identity, or even a unified Black experience to lay out precisely how patriarchal violence and racial capitalism affected Black women distinctly from how it affected white men, how it exploited Black working-class women differently from how it exploited white working-class men. If one reads anything in the Black feminist canon, such as books and articles by Audre Lorde, bell hooks, Angela Davis, Patricia Hill Collins, or Kimberlé Crenshaw, and this is not mentioning the hundreds of thousands of other scholars and activists who continue this work, one can scarcely get a sense that they are uninterested in class or have backgrounded capitalism and class politics for a simplistic “identitarianism”. One wonders if those who propound this anti-Identitarian line have actually read a word of Black feminist literature at all. Idealist Fables Second, this anti-Identitarian fable is a profoundly idealist, and as such is an anti-Marxist, analysis of the history of the last sixty years. It presumes that the battle between labour and capital was won entirely by capital in the academies of the Western core. In this story, somehow simultaneously, Stuart Hall, Selma James, Silvia Federici, Robin D. G. Kelley, Judith Butler, and scores of other leading Leftists around the world nefariously invented post-modernism to fit the ideological requirements of neoliberalism and thus convinced their many students to stop fighting capital and instead take up fighting endless social media wars about culture and popular representations of identity. The contempt one must have for feminists’ essential work on describing the mutual imbrication of patriarchy and capitalism – of the central role of gender in capitalist society’s division of labour and its extraction of surplus value by rendering childcare and housework unpaid – to make this case is startling. On the one hand, the story completely misses the foundational new insights and frameworks that so many Marxists in so many different spaces and countries developed in understanding the racial, gendered, and imperial dimensions of modern capitalism. Dimensions that actively hinder worker-solidarity and worker-leadership and that must be understood to sustain any successful revolutionary politics. On the other hand, it deeply misunderstands the history of the post-1960s class struggle. Neoliberalism didn’t win because post-modernism hypnotized the Western core’s middle classes into somnolence. Neoliberalism won because the ruling classes fought and fought with the might of the state. Neoliberalism also won because the social-democratic parties that the middle-classes of the Western core continued to vote for essentially gave up on their working-class constituencies. Social-democratic parties that were supported by unions representing a labour aristocracy more interested in maintaining a nationalist class compromise with large firms than challenging the racial, gendered, and imperialist relations of expropriation which sustained Western economic growth. In the US, the Democratic party went on to break unions, retrenched the welfare state, perpetuated a racial backlash to Black power in the 1960s in the form of brutal mass incarceration, and undertook permanent war in the political-economic peripheries to shore up imperial value-chains. The very scholars and organizers who most astutely theorized, identified and enacted important acts of rebellion to halt the advance of heterosexist patriarchal imperialist capitalism – as bell hooks puts it - come under fire from Jacobin radicals for missing class altogether. The Freedom to make inconvenient Arguments? Now, those in the Jacobin public sphere who hold these views have responded to these critiques in two ways. One, they say that all the people named above are people of colour, and so to critique these academics as perpetuating a “white socialism” is to erase their identity and thus perpetuate a new form of erasure of POC views that are apparently “inconvenient” for most radicals. This is a bad-faith critique, because if the Jacobin public-sphere is against the confusions of identity politics altogether, then why put forward the identities of these scholars as relevant to the discussion at all? Presumably, this is to get at the arbitrariness and meaningless of one’s identity positions in trying to explain one’s political positions, and that a clean line cannot be drawn from the former to the latter. That to describe a person of colour’s political analysis as “white” is to deny them the freedom to make inconvenient arguments. But if race, gender, and empire are central dimensions of contemporary capitalist exploitation, and we have seen above a series of writers who seem interested in minimizing these dimensions for a nationalist class-first analysis; the consequences of such an analysis are that by being blind to how class itself is racialized and gendered, it would fail to question the very hierarchies people of colour and feminists are trying to fight. Second, some in the Jacobin public sphere respond by lumping together feminists on the radical left and radical people of colour who make these substantial critiques with centrists and contemporary neoliberals who have weaponised a superficial politics of representation as a single, all-powerful group: the Identitarian left. Once again, any knowledge of the history of the Black, feminist, and LGBTQ movements in the US will yield the simple fact that they have been and continue to be heavily contested between liberal reformist and radical Marxist currents - among many others - and that no generalization can be made about these large mobilizations as inherently neo-liberal. These puzzling arguments merely heighten the sense that such anti-identitarian critiques are woefully under-theorised and are perhaps made to incite controversy and anger more than thought and action. The fact of the matter is that Jacobin’s politics are already intersectional to some degree. That they consistently foreground the work of leading scholars and activists from all of the “identitarian” movements suggests that they implicitly presuppose the radical victories that identity politics has won for the radical Left: the inclusion of women, people of colour, indigenous people, lesbian, gay, trans and queer people, and a principled international solidarity with anti-imperialist struggles around the world at the heart of radical politics. There seems to be no need to prosecute this clumsy culture-war against such a poorly defined identitarianism per se, especially one that pointedly appears to erase the significant contributions that Black feminists have made in theorizing and organizing large communities against neoliberalism; most recently in leading the Movement for Black Lives and bringing forward prison abolition as a central struggle in the fight against racial capitalism. Words have meaning, and they have consequences. Continuing to deplore “the margins” as a frame of analysis and insisting on an imagined working-class unity will only continue to antagonize those on the Left who have long been organizing against patriarchal imperialist racial capitalism and will continue to do so, with or without certain Jacobin contributors’ seal of approval on the effectiveness of their politics. Practical Consequences What are some other practical consequences of this line of analysis? One, it is perniciously false on its own terms and refuses to engage seriously with radical queer, feminist, Black, and internationalist political movements that have continued to contest patriarchal racial capitalism in the last forty years: from forcing American civil society, the state, insurance, and pharmaceutical industries to address the treatment of HIV/AIDS, to materially denting the ability of Israel to carry out business and promote apologia for its apartheid regime around the world, to building coalitions with prisoners that bring together violently policed working-class Black and Latino communities in deindustrialized cities (as Ruth Wilson Gilmore documents in “Golden Gulag”). Indeed, the recent legislative victory of forcing Republican senators to vote against their own healthcare bill was secured to a large extent by the courage and steadfast mobilization of disability rights campaigners in the past year. Through personal testimonies and consistently disruptive direct action, they have made it clear that Trump’s healthcare bill is going to kill them; that their illnesses incur medical costs which they are not able to pay, that the rise in insurance premiums will be fatal. The lens of disability and race forcing us to confront the fact that capitalist healthcare is eugenics. If one tries to explain these victories as either identitarian reformism on the one hand, or inadequate grasps at class struggle on the other; one misses the significantly novel ways in which they have helped form radical communities that make a working-class rather than presume one. Finally, in failing to be internationalist, this kind of class-first analysis – one which relies on a notion of an accepted common sense which any socialist politics should effectively mobilize (a notion usefully criticized in this piece in New Socialist) fails to challenge pervasive white-supremacist and bourgeois ideas about who it is that constitutes a worker, and who a foreign parasite, who it is that can govern themselves and who needs to be policed, or deported. The temptation to mobilize what appears so obviously “working-class angst” without interrogating how it is racialized and gendered or whether the targets are capitalists and not migrant workers is something UK Labour has consistently struggled with before and during the era of Blairism. In recent comments, Jeremy Corbyn offered a plainly false argument that it was the “wholesale importation” of Central European workers which destroyed labour conditions in the construction industry. As Maya Goodfellow argues here, migration doesn’t bring down wages, union-busting does. Further, Corbyn’s comments, like much discussion around Brexit, made no mention of non-EU nationals: Asian and African migrants living in the UK. Support for Leave and more broadly, support for “controls on immigration” is to a measurable degree driven by racial animus towards non-European migrants. A socialist Labour movement must respond by challenging these sentiments on the level of ideology and putting forth a clear legislative agenda for abolishing Theresa May’s (and Tony Blair’s) brutal Home Office and its ICE-like incarceration and deportation regime.

### AT Fisher

#### The Vampire Castle link LITERALLY pathologizes the 1AC. The metaphor says that black leftists who don’t pledge their loyalty to Marx are ravenous blood suckers. Fisher is a film critic, he has no qualifications to diagnose us and yet his writing is littered with the rhetoric of the medical model. Also if the alt can solve twitter beef in the UK than it overcomes the residual links to the aff.

Fisher 2013 – Mark Fisher is the author of Capitalist Realism and the forthcoming Ghosts of my Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures (both published by Zer0 books, where he is now a Commissioning Editor). His writing has appeared in a wide variety of publications, including Film Quarterly, The Wire, The Guardian and Frieze. He is Programme Leader of the MA in Aural and Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London and a lecturer at the University of East London. (“Exiting the Vampire Castle” http://www.thenorthstar.info/2013/11/22/exiting-the-vampire-castle/) KR

‘Left-wing’ Twitter can often be a miserable, dispiriting zone. Earlier this year, there were some high-profile twitterstorms, in which particular left-identifying figures were ‘called out’ and condemned. What these figures had said was sometimes objectionable; but nevertheless, the way in which they were personally vilified and hounded left a horrible residue: the stench of bad conscience and witch-hunting moralism. The reason I didn’t speak out on any of these incidents, I’m ashamed to say, was fear. The bullies were in another part of the playground. I didn’t want to attract their attention to me.

The open savagery of these exchanges was accompanied by something more pervasive, and for that reason perhaps more debilitating: an atmosphere of snarky resentment. The most frequent object of this resentment is Owen Jones, and the attacks on Jones – the person most responsible for raising class consciousness in the UK in the last few years – were one of the reasons I was so dejected. If this is what happens to a left-winger who is actually succeeding in taking the struggle to the centre ground of British life, why would anyone want to follow him into the mainstream? Is the only way to avoid this drip-feed of abuse to remain in a position of impotent marginality?

One of the things that broke me out of this depressive stupor was going to the People’s Assembly in Ipswich, near where I live. The People’s Assembly had been greeted with the usual sneers and snarks. This was, we were told, a useless stunt, in which media leftists, including Jones, were aggrandising themselves in yet another display of top-down celebrity culture. What actually happened at the Assembly in Ipswich was very different to this caricature. The first half of the evening – culminating in a rousing speech by Owen Jones – was certainly led by the top-table speakers. But the second half of the meeting saw working class activists from all over Suffolk talking to each other, supporting one another, sharing experiences and strategies. Far from being another example of hierarchical leftism, the People’s Assembly was an example of how the vertical can be combined with the horizontal: media power and charisma could draw people who hadn’t previously been to a political meeting into the room, where they could talk and strategise with seasoned activists. The atmosphere was anti-racist and anti-sexist, but refreshingly free of the paralysing feeling of guilt and suspicion which hangs over left-wing twitter like an acrid, stifling fog.

Then there was Russell Brand. I’ve long been an admirer of Brand – one of the few big-name comedians on the current scene to come from a working class background. Over the last few years, there has been a gradual but remorseless embourgeoisement of television comedy, with preposterous ultra-posh nincompoop Michael McIntyre and a dreary drizzle of bland graduate chancers dominating the stage.

The day before Brand’s now famous interview with Jeremy Paxman was broadcast on Newsnight, I had seen Brand’s stand-up show the Messiah Complex in Ipswich. The show was defiantly pro-immigrant, pro-communist, anti-homophobic, saturated with working class intelligence and not afraid to show it, and queer in the way that popular culture used to be (i.e. nothing to do with the sour-faced identitarian piety foisted upon us by moralisers on the post-structuralist ‘left’). Malcolm X, Che, politics as a psychedelic dismantling of existing reality: this was communism as something cool, sexy and proletarian, instead of a finger-wagging sermon.

The next night, it was clear that Brand’s appearance had produced a moment of splitting. For some of us, Brand’s forensic take-down of Paxman was intensely moving, miraculous; I couldn’t remember the last time a person from a working class background had been given the space to so consummately destroy a class ‘superior’ using intelligence and reason. This wasn’t Johnny Rotten swearing at Bill Grundy – an act of antagonism which confirmed rather than challenged class stereotypes. Brand had outwitted Paxman – and the use of humour was what separated Brand from the dourness of so much ‘leftism’. Brand makes people feel good about themselves; whereas the moralising left specialises in making people feed bad, and is not happy until their heads are bent in guilt and self-loathing.

The moralising left quickly ensured that the story was not about Brand’s extraordinary breach of the bland conventions of mainstream media ‘debate’, nor about his claim that revolution was going to happen. (This last claim could only be heard by the cloth-eared petit-bourgeois narcissistic ‘left’ as Brand saying that he wanted to lead the revolution – something that they responded to with typical resentment: ‘I don’t need a jumped-up celebrity to lead me‘.) For the moralisers, the dominant story was to be about Brand’s personal conduct – specifically his sexism. In the febrile McCarthyite atmosphere fermented by the moralising left, remarks that could be construed as sexist mean that Brand is a sexist, which also meant that he is a misogynist. Cut and dried, finished, condemned.

It is right that Brand, like any of us, should answer for his behaviour and the language that he uses. But such questioning should take place in an atmosphere of comradeship and solidarity, and probably not in public in the first instance – although when Brand was questioned about sexism by Mehdi Hasan, he displayed exactly the kind of good-humoured humility that was entirely lacking in the stony faces of those who had judged him. “I don’t think I’m sexist, But I remember my grandmother, the loveliest person I‘ve ever known, but she was racist, but I don’t think she knew. I don’t know if I have some cultural hangover, I know that I have a great love of proletariat linguistics, like ‘darling’ and ‘bird’, so if women think I’m sexist they’re in a better position to judge than I am, so I’ll work on that.”

Brand’s intervention was not a bid for leadership; it was an inspiration, a call to arms. And I for one was inspired. Where a few months before, I would have stayed silent as the PoshLeft moralisers subjected Brand to their kangaroo courts and character assassinations – with ‘evidence’ usually gleaned from the right-wing press, always available to lend a hand – this time I was prepared to take them on. The response to Brand quickly became as significant as the Paxman exchange itself. As Laura Oldfield Ford pointed out, this was a clarifying moment. And one of the things that was clarified for me was the way in which, in recent years, so much of the self-styled ‘left’ has suppressed the question of class.

Class consciousness is fragile and fleeting. The petit bourgeoisie which dominates the academy and the culture industry has all kinds of subtle deflections and pre-emptions which prevent the topic even coming up, and then, if it does come up, they make one think it is a terrible impertinence, a breach of etiquette, to raise it. I’ve been speaking now at left-wing, anti-capitalist events for years, but I’ve rarely talked – or been asked to talk – about class in public.

But, once class had re-appeared, it was impossible not to see it everywhere in the response to the Brand affair. Brand was quickly judged and-or questioned by at least three ex-private school people on the left. Others told us that Brand couldn’t really be working class, because he was a millionaire. It’s alarming how many ‘leftists’ seemed to fundamentally agree with the drift behind Paxman’s question: ‘What gives this working class person the authority to speak?’ It’s also alarming, actually distressing, that they seem to think that working class people should remain in poverty, obscurity and impotence lest they lose their ‘authenticity’.

Someone passed me a post written about Brand on Facebook. I don’t know the individual who wrote it, and I wouldn’t wish to name them. What’s important is that the post was symptomatic of a set of snobbish and condescending attitudes that it is apparently alright to exhibit while still classifying oneself as left wing. The whole tone was horrifyingly high-handed, as if they were a schoolteacher marking a child’s work, or a psychiatrist assessing a patient. Brand, apparently, is ‘clearly extremely unstable … one bad relationship or career knockback away from collapsing back into drug addiction or worse.’ Although the person claims that they ‘really quite like [Brand]’, it perhaps never occurs to them that one of the reasons that Brand might be ‘unstable’ is just this sort of patronising faux-transcendent ‘assessment’ from the ‘left’ bourgeoisie. There’s also a shocking but revealing aside where the individual casually refers to Brand’s ‘patchy education [and] the often wince-inducing vocab slips characteristic of the auto-didact’ – which, this individual generously says, ‘I have no problem with at all’ – how very good of them! This isn’t some colonial bureaucrat writing about his attempts to teach some ‘natives’ the English language in the nineteenth century, or a Victorian schoolmaster at some private institution describing a scholarship boy, it’s a ‘leftist’ writing a few weeks ago.

Where to go from here? It is first of all necessary to identify the features of the discourses and the desires which have led us to this grim and demoralising pass, where class has disappeared, but moralism is everywhere, where solidarity is impossible, but guilt and fear are omnipresent – and not because we are terrorised by the right, but because we have allowed bourgeois modes of subjectivity to contaminate our movement. I think there are two libidinal-discursive configurations which have brought this situation about. They call themselves left wing, but – as the Brand episode has made clear – they are many ways a sign that the left – defined as an agent in a class struggle – has all but disappeared.

Inside the Vampires’ Castle

The first configuration is what I came to call the Vampires’ Castle. The Vampires’ Castle specialises in propagating guilt. It is driven by a priest’s desire to excommunicate and condemn, an academic-pedant’s desire to be the first to be seen to spot a mistake, and a hipster’s desire to be one of the in-crowd. The danger in attacking the Vampires’ Castle is that it can look as if – and it will do everything it can to reinforce this thought – that one is also attacking the struggles against racism, sexism, heterosexism. But, far from being the only legitimate expression of such struggles, the Vampires’ Castle is best understood as a bourgeois-liberal perversion and appropriation of the energy of these movements. The Vampires’ Castle was born the moment when the struggle not to be defined by identitarian categories became the quest to have ‘identities’ recognised by a bourgeois big Other.

The privilege I certainly enjoy as a white male consists in part in my not being aware of my ethnicity and my gender, and it is a sobering and revelatory experience to occasionally be made aware of these blind-spots. But, rather than seeking a world in which everyone achieves freedom from identitarian classification, the Vampires’ Castle seeks to corral people back into identi-camps, where they are forever defined in the terms set by dominant power, crippled by self-consciousness and isolated by a logic of solipsism which insists that we cannot understand one another unless we belong to the same identity group.

I’ve noticed a fascinating magical inversion projection-disavowal mechanism whereby the sheer mention of class is now automatically treated as if that means one is trying to downgrade the importance of race and gender. In fact, the exact opposite is the case, as the Vampires’ Castle uses an ultimately liberal understanding of race and gender to obfuscate class. In all of the absurd and traumatic twitterstorms about privilege earlier this year it was noticeable that the discussion of class privilege was entirely absent. The task, as ever, remains the articulation of class, gender and race – but the founding move of the Vampires’ Castle is the dis-articulation of class from other categories.

The problem that the Vampires’ Castle was set up to solve is this: how do you hold immense wealth and power while also appearing as a victim, marginal and oppositional? The solution was already there – in the Christian Church. So the VC has recourse to all the infernal strategies, dark pathologies and psychological torture instruments Christianity invented, and which Nietzsche described in The Genealogy of Morals. This priesthood of bad conscience, this nest of pious guilt-mongers, is exactly what Nietzsche predicted when he said that something worse than Christianity was already on the way. Now, here it is …

The Vampires’ Castle feeds on the energy and anxieties and vulnerabilities of young students, but most of all it lives by converting the suffering of particular groups – the more ‘marginal’ the better – into academic capital. The most lauded figures in the Vampires’ Castle are those who have spotted a new market in suffering – those who can find a group more oppressed and subjugated than any previously exploited will find themselves promoted through the ranks very quickly.

The first law of the Vampires’ Castle is: individualise and privatise everything. While in theory it claims to be in favour of structural critique, in practice it never focuses on anything except individual behaviour. Some of these working class types are not terribly well brought up, and can be very rude at times. Remember: condemning individuals is always more important than paying attention to impersonal structures. The actual ruling class propagates ideologies of individualism, while tending to act as a class. (Many of what we call ‘conspiracies’ are the ruling class showing class solidarity.) The VC, as dupe-servants of the ruling class, does the opposite: it pays lip service to ‘solidarity’ and ‘collectivity’, while always acting as if the individualist categories imposed by power really hold. Because they are petit-bourgeois to the core, the members of the Vampires’ Castle are intensely competitive, but this is repressed in the passive aggressive manner typical of the bourgeoisie. What holds them together is not solidarity, but mutual fear – the fear that they will be the next one to be outed, exposed, condemned.

The second law of the Vampires’ Castle is: make thought and action appear very, very difficult. There must be no lightness, and certainly no humour. Humour isn’t serious, by definition, right? Thought is hard work, for people with posh voices and furrowed brows. Where there is confidence, introduce scepticism. Say: don’t be hasty, we have to think more deeply about this. Remember: having convictions is oppressive, and might lead to gulags.

The third law of the Vampires’ Castle is: propagate as much guilt as you can. The more guilt the better. People must feel bad: it is a sign that they understand the gravity of things. It’s OK to be class-privileged if you feel guilty about privilege and make others in a subordinate class position to you feel guilty too. You do some good works for the poor, too, right?

The fourth law of the Vampires’ Castle is: essentialize. While fluidity of identity, pluarity and multiplicity are always claimed on behalf of the VC members – partly to cover up their own invariably wealthy, privileged or bourgeois-assimilationist background – the enemy is always to be essentialized. Since the desires animating the VC are in large part priests’ desires to excommunicate and condemn, there has to be a strong distinction between Good and Evil, with the latter essentialized. Notice the tactics. X has made a remark/ has behaved in a particular way – these remarks/ this behaviour might be construed as transphobic/ sexist etc. So far, OK. But it’s the next move which is the kicker. X then becomes defined as a transphobe/ sexist etc. Their whole identity becomes defined by one ill-judged remark or behavioural slip. Once the VC has mustered its witch-hunt, the victim (often from a working class background, and not schooled in the passive aggressive etiquette of the bourgeoisie) can reliably be goaded into losing their temper, further securing their position as pariah/ latest to be consumed in feeding frenzy.

The fifth law of the Vampires’ Castle: think like a liberal (because you are one). The VC’s work of constantly stoking up reactive outrage consists of endlessly pointing out the screamingly obvious: capital behaves like capital (it’s not very nice!), repressive state apparatuses are repressive. We must protest!

Neo-anarchy in the UK

The second libidinal formation is neo-anarchism. By neo-anarchists I definitely do not mean anarchists or syndicalists involved in actual workplace organisation, such as the Solidarity Federation. I mean, rather, those who identify as anarchists but whose involvement in politics extends little beyond student protests and occupations, and commenting on Twitter. Like the denizens of the Vampires’ Castle, neo-anarchists usually come from a petit-bourgeois background, if not from somewhere even more class-privileged.

They are also overwhelmingly young: in their twenties or at most their early thirties, and what informs the neo-anarchist position is a narrow historical horizon. Neo-anarchists have experienced nothing but capitalist realism. By the time the neo-anarchists had come to political consciousness – and many of them have come to political consciousness remarkably recently, given the level of bullish swagger they sometimes display – the Labour Party had become a Blairite shell, implementing neo-liberalism with a small dose of social justice on the side. But the problem with neo-anarchism is that it unthinkingly reflects this historical moment rather than offering any escape from it. It forgets, or perhaps is genuinely unaware of, the Labour Party’s role in nationalising major industries and utilities or founding the National Health Service. Neo-anarchists will assert that ‘parliamentary politics never changed anything’, or the ‘Labour Party was always useless’ while attending protests about the NHS, or retweeting complaints about the dismantling of what remains of the welfare state. There’s a strange implicit rule here: it’s OK to protest against what parliament has done, but it’s not alright to enter into parliament or the mass media to attempt to engineer change from there. Mainstream media is to be disdained, but BBC Question Time is to be watched and moaned about on Twitter. Purism shades into fatalism; better not to be in any way tainted by the corruption of the mainstream, better to uselessly ‘resist’ than to risk getting your hands dirty.

It’s not surprising, then, that so many neo-anarchists come across as depressed. This depression is no doubt reinforced by the anxieties of postgraduate life, since, like the Vampires’ Castle, neo-anarchism has its natural home in universities, and is usually propagated by those studying for postgraduate qualifications, or those who have recently graduated from such study.

What is to be done?

Why have these two configurations come to the fore? The first reason is that they have been allowed to prosper by capital because they serve its interests. Capital subdued the organised working class by decomposing class consciousness, viciously subjugating trade unions while seducing ‘hard working families’ into identifying with their own narrowly defined interests instead of the interests of the wider class; but why would capital be concerned about a ‘left’ that replaces class politics with a moralising individualism, and that, far from building solidarity, spreads fear and insecurity?

The second reason is what Jodi Dean has called communicative capitalism. It might have been possible to ignore the Vampires’ Castle and the neo-anarchists if it weren’t for capitalist cyberspace. The VC’s pious moralising has been a feature of a certain ‘left’ for many years – but, if one wasn’t a member of this particular church, its sermons could be avoided. Social media means that this is no longer the case, and there is little protection from the psychic pathologies propagated by these discourses.

### 2AC Cap Link Turn—Epistemic Disobedience

#### Embracing epistemic disobedience is the key to collapse capitalism

Mignolo 12 Walter Mignolo Director of the Center for Global Studies and the Humanities, at Duke UniversityGlobalization and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: The Role of the Humanities in the Corporate University, In the American Style University at Large, Ed. by Kathryn L. Kleypas, James I. McDougall, pp6-8.

There are-to start with-two kinds of histories of the university as an institution that may help us understand the dilemmas now confronting universities all over the world. In the Plan Bologna in Europe and at the meeting at Davos on the future of the university, learning is turned into a tool for efficiency and economic development whereby "learning to manage" becomes the central role in the corporate university? The task of learning to unlearn is urgent as far as management and efficiency are the terms of the rhetoric of modernity and progress that conceals the logic of coloniality and domination. For whom is management and efficiency beneficial'? In the recent past the world has witnessed two failures that were guided by the rhetoric of management and efficiency: the invasion of Iraq and the collapse of Wall Street. That route of knowing, the belief under which knowledge is created and arguments built, is no longer tenable. To imagine non-managerial futures based on the principle of "living well" rather than in efficiency and the belief (or make believe) that good management and efficiency will bring happiness to all is an ideal that benefits the elite who put forward the idea and can maintain it through various means (e.g., institutions, money, media). We need then to recap the history of higher learning in Western civilization. Because in its history the university has been linked to colonial expansion since the sixteenth century, and it is therefore imperial. Learning to unlearn is a decolonial endeavor in two senses: it is necessary to simultaneously decolonize imperial education and work towards decolonial education. Since the European Renaissance and European colonial expansion in the sixteenth century-that is, the foundational moment of the modern/colonial world-the accumulation of money has gone hand in hand with the accumulation of meaning and of knowledge. Today "historical-structural dependency" still structures the world, both economically and epistemically. How did that happen'? How was it possible that a local conception of knowledge, grounded on Greek and Roman experience and categories of thought, became hegemonic through various stages of five centuries of imperial expansion'? In what follows we will sketch how that happened and, in the end, we will advance some ideas of how to delink from that imperial legacy and engage in epistemic disobedience. Before engaging in that task, we need to identify the logic and the consequences of imperial thinking. Western categories of thought (grounded in Greek and Latin and translated into the six modern European imperial languages: Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and English) put any other category in a double bind: either they are incorporated (and their singularity erased) into West.ern categories (e.g., transforming Hinduism and Buddhism into "religions") or they are dismissed and rejected, including all economies that are based on capitalist principles and knowledges that cannot be assimilated into Western nonnativization of life and subjectivities, from govermnents to "popular" knowledge (e.g., Vandana Sl1iva's report on traditional knowledge of the forest or the administration of water in conditions of water scarcity). The logic of Western imperial epistemology consists of a meta-discourse that validates itself by disqualifying difference. That is, it consists of making and remaking epistemic colonial difference: barbarian, primitives, Orientals, Indians, and blacks are qualified as people "outside" or "behind" who need to be brought into the modern present. Modernity then is not a historical epoch, but an imperial category of self-validation and disqualification of the epistemic difference. Take philosophy of science, for example. Once these categories of knowledge have been institutionalized in Western scholarship and translated into common sense (or in Western appropriation of Greek and Roman legacies), they become totalitarian, preventing any other kind of knowledge from being recognized at the same level as philosophy and sciences. Political theory (democracy) or political economy (capitalism) are similar examples; after the financial crisis of 2008-2009 the main issue in the media and higher-learning institutions was how to save capitalism, not to ask if another economic system (based on reciprocity instead of gain and accumulation that promotes destruction and killing in all forms, from wars to food crises) were viable. Learning to unlearn means to delink from the illusion that knowledge in all spheres of life is bound to one set of categories that are both universal and Western. To start shifting the geo-politics of knowledge, delinking and engaging in epistemic disobedience, it is necessary to excavate the foundation of Western categories and principles about the knowledge itself and the values attached to certain kinds of knowledge used to devalue epistemic differences: that is, building and maintaining the epistemic colonial difference that reverts and complements imperial epistemic differences. For example, Mandarin, Russian, and Arabic to name a few languages spoken by billions of people are not languages sustainable in the epistemic world order. Knowing how and critical thinking can be found in any community. Knowing how is a matter of surviving and living in a community. But with knowing /1011' comes knowing that, which is the first level of theoretical knowing. Knowing what projects theoretical knowing into a level of complexity in which other doings and thinking enter into consideration: knowing w/mt is the theoretical level that operates in the domain of options. One perhaps could say that the Greek breakthrough was to move from knowing that to knowing what and the achievement of Western civilization was to capitalize on it: theology, philosophy and sciences are three disciplinary formations responding to the same basic principles upon which knowing what has been built. Exploring and unveiling such principles have become an urgent task for decolonial humanities in confrontation with corporate values of management and efficiency. Therefore, decolonial humanities means epistemic disobedience (since critiquing the foundation of Western knowledge while accepting Western epistemic rules of the game will not go very far-it will remain within an obedient kind of criticism) and delinking. It means learning to unlearn (delinking, epistemic disobedience)

in order to re-learn (inventing and working out decolonial categories of thoughts that will allow building non-capitalist and imperial values and subjectivities).